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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON FAMILY AND LABOR ECONOMICS
BY
FATMA ROMEH MOHAMED ALI
AUGUST 2016
Committee Chair: Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of three distinct yet interrelated essays in family and labor
Economics. In particular, I examine the impact of household demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics on household decisions related to the investment in child human capital such as
fertility, child health and child labor. The first chapter examines the impact of women’s
education on household fertility decision. I use the change in the length of primary schooling in
Egypt in 1988 to extract an exogenous variation in female education using a nonparametric
regression discontinuity design. My analysis shows that female education significantly reduces
the number of children born per woman. The reduction in fertility seems to result from delaying
maternal age rather than changing women’s fertility preferences. I also provide evidence that
female education in Egypt does not boost women’s labor force participation or increase their
usages of contraceptive methods. Female education, however, does increase women’s age at
marriage which might explain the delay of maternal age.
The second chapter uses the same identification strategy to examine the impact of
parental education on child health outcomes. The results suggest that parental education does not
have significant effects on child mortality or nutritional status. I provide evidence that among
low-educated parents in Egypt, education has no significant impacts on parents’ intermediate

outcomes that are essential to improve child health such as literacy skills, access to information,
and health behavior.
The third chapter examines the effect of income on parents’ decision to send their
children to work. The empirical literature on child labor has found conflicting results regarding
whether poverty does or does not lead parents to send their children to work. A majority of these
studies treat child laborers as a single homogeneous group. Recent data from the International
Labor Organization, however, reveals substantial differences among child workers in employer
types, work patterns, and work intensity. This suggests that parental reasons for sending their
children to work could vary with the type of work, which might explain discrepancies in
previous studies. I use data from the 2010 Egypt National Child Labor Survey to estimate the
effects of parental income on child labor for various subpopulations of working children. In
addition to measures of household characteristics, this dataset provides rich information about
the working conditions of child laborers. My analysis shows that the effect of parental income on
child labor is minimal among children who work in family businesses and in jobs not highly
physical, jobs nonhazardous, and jobs during school breaks. In contrast, higher parental income
does decrease the likelihood of child labor in market work, jobs that are physical, hazardous jobs,
and full-year jobs. In short, higher family incomes deter types of child labor most harmful to
children, while having little effect on types of work least likely to be harmful.
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Introduction
Household decisions have significant impacts on child cognitive and noncognitive skills,
which affect children's educational attainment and earnings, plus other outcomes such as crime
and health. Recent research has shown that a considerable portion of poverty and income
inequality in society is due to factors determined by age 18 (Cunha & Heckman, 2007). Thus,
understanding how poor households make investment decisions in their children and what
incentives motivate them are crucial in designing effective interventions to reduce poverty. In
this dissertation, using Egypt as a case study, I examine the impacts of household demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics on household decisions related to fertility, child health, and
child labor. I employ both econometric analysis and program evaluation methods, such as
regression discontinuity, to extract exogenous variations and estimate causal effects.
The first chapter of this dissertation investigates the relationship between women’s
education and fertility outcomes. Gary Becker's child quantity-quality trade-off hypothesis
suggests that smaller family size enhances children's outcomes since parents with fewer children
have more resources available to spend on each child. Therefore, it is necessary to understand
household decisions about how many children to have in order to design policies that effectively
reduce family size and improve children's outcomes. In this chapter, I focus on the relationship
between female education and fertility. Previous empirical studies of developing countries that
examined this relationship have faced difficulties in handling the problem of omitted variables
such as a woman's innate ability, preferences, and community background. For instance, some
communities place a small value on female education and encourage big family sizes. In such
context, both female education and family size are driven by other factors that are difficult to
control for in empirical models.
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In this chapter, I use the change in length of primary schooling in Egypt as the source of
exogenous variation in education. Beginning in 1988, the Egyptian government cut the number
of primary school years from six to five, moving from a 12-year system of pre-university
education to an 11-year system. This policy change applied to all individuals born on or after
October 1977. Using pooled cross-section data from 1992 to 2014 and a nonparametric
regression discontinuity approach, I compare education and fertility of women born just before
and right after October 1977. The results show that female education reduces the number of
children born per woman and postpones maternal age. Women's education, however, does not
appear to change women’s preferences toward the ideal number of children they want to have. I
also provide evidence that female education in Egypt does not improve women’s job
opportunities or increase their usages of contraceptive methods. Female education, however,
does increase women’s age at marriage which explains the delay of maternal age.
The second chapter of my dissertation uses the same identification strategy of the first
chapter to examine the impact of parental education on children’s health outcomes. The majority
of the previous research has found that increasing parental education, especially maternal
education, improves child health. For instance, a recent study that has been published in the
British medical journal, the Lancet, found that half the reduction in child mortality over the past
four decades can be attributed to the improvement in female education. The extent, however, to
which these estimates amount to causality has remained a challenge, not least because of the
potential endogeneity of parental education. In this chapter, I exploit the reduction in the length
of primary schooling in Egypt in 1988 to create exogenous variations in parental education.
Using data from the Birth Recode modules of the Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey
(1995-2014) and applying a nonparametric regression discontinuity approach, I found that
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parental education improves child nutritional status and reduces mortality. These effects,
however, are not statistically significant across a broad range of specifications and different
restrictions on the sample. I also provide suggestive evidence that education has little effects on
parents’ intermediate outcomes that are expected to be essential to improve child health such as
literacy skills, access to information, and health behavior.
The third chapter of my dissertation examines the effect of income on parents’ decision to
send their children to work. The empirical literature on child labor has found conflicting results
related to the effect of parental income on child labor. A majority of these studies treat child
laborers as a single homogeneous group. Recent data from the International Labor Organization,
however, reveals substantial differences among child workers in employer types, work patterns,
and work intensity (Diallo, Etienne, & Mehran, 2013). In particular, some children face
unfavorable work conditions such as working in jobs that are highly physical and hazardous. On
the other hand, other children work in favorable work conditions such as working in their
families’ businesses or working only during their school breaks.
The heterogeneity among working children suggests variations in parental perceptions on
child’s work, and hence, in parental reasons to send their children to work. To illustrate, some
families, despite being nonpoor, might prefer to engage their children in work if they perceive
nonpecuniary returns to child’s work. Examples of these non-pecuniary returns include teaching
children the importance of education in enhancing future outcomes and helping children develop
self-reliance and independence. Parents who engage their children in work for non-pecuniary
returns are more likely to ensure that their children gain these benefits under favorable working
conditions. Therefore, they are less likely to allow their children to become exhausted from work
or let work deter them from going to school. On the other hand, parents who view child’s work
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as an additional source of income for the household (pecuniary return) are more likely to opt for
types of child’s work that have significant monetary returns but might provide unsafe and highly
demanding working conditions for their children.
To support this argument, I use data from the 2010 Egypt National Child Labor Survey to
estimate the effects of parental income on child labor for various subpopulations of working
children. This dataset provides rich information about the working conditions of child laborers in
addition to measures of household characteristics. My analysis shows that higher parental
income does decrease the likelihood of child labor in unfavorable work conditions such as jobs
that are physical, hazardous jobs, and full-year jobs. In contrast, higher family income does not
significantly reduce child’s work in jobs not highly physical, jobs nonhazardous, and jobs during
school breaks. This finding gives rise to other nonpecuniary motivations that might drive
parents’ decisions in this case.

4

Chapter I: The Impact of Female Education on Fertility: A Natural Experiment from
Egypt

1. Introduction
Educating girls has usually been advocated as an effective way to curtail rapid population
growth in developing countries (UNFPA, 1994). The common justification, driven by Becker’s
writings and others, is that highly educated women tend to have higher income jobs and hence
higher opportunity costs of childbearing. Additionally, highly educated women tend to have
superior knowledge and practices regarding contraceptive methods (Becker, 1960, 1993; Becker
& Lewis, 1973).
Earlier empirical studies of developing countries in the 1990s and early 2000s
documented a negative correlation between female education and the number of children born
per woman (Al-Qudsi, 1998; Bhargava, 2007; Cochrane, Khan, & Osheba, 1990; Handa, 2000;
Lam & Duryea, 1999; Martίn & Juάrez, 1995). These studies, however, did not adequately
account for the endogeneity of female education. Unobserved factors such as a woman’s ability,
preferences, and family and community background are all expected to be correlated with
schooling and fertility decisions. For instance, some communities in developing countries place a
small value on female education and encourage big family sizes. In this cultural context, a
negative correlation between female education and fertility can be observed even if female
education per se does not have a causal impact on fertility.
To correct for the endogeneity of education, few recent studies of developing countries
used government education reforms in Indonesia and Nigeria as sources of exogenous variations
in education (Breierova & Duflo, 2004; Osili & Long, 2008). My chapter contributes to this
growing literature by using a natural experiment from the Middle East to create an exogenous
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variation in education and examine its impact on fertility. In particular, I use the change in the
length of primary schooling during 1988-89 to handle the endogeneity of education. Beginning
in 1988, the Egyptian government cut the length of primary education from six to five years,
moving from a 12-year system of pre-university education to an 11-year system (law No.233 of
1988)1. The five-year primary system was universal throughout the country. The first school
cohort subjected to this system was born between October 1, 1977 and September 30, 1978.
Therefore, October 1, 1977, represents a cutoff date such that individuals born before that
date had to attend one more year of primary schooling than individuals born on or after that date.
Assuming that women born immediately after and just before October 1, 1977, are similar in
baseline characteristics, the differences in their completed years of education in adulthood are
exogenous. In fact, even if some parents can plan when their children are born, they are less
likely to have full control over the exact date of birth. Moreover, the elimination of grade 6
occurred in 1988, and it applied immediately to children who were about 11 years old at that
time. Hence, it is unlikely that parents would have anticipated that such a policy change would
have happened 11 years in the future.
Therefore, the policy change can be regarded as good as a random local experiment
around the cutoff date allowing one to compare fertility of women born right before and right
after October 1, 1977, and relate this to the difference in their education. My identification
strategy is quite close to the recent studies of developed countries that attempted to create

1

Before this change, the high school diploma in Egypt was composed of six years primary school, three years
preparatory school, and three years secondary school, for a total of 12 years. After the policy change, the high school
diploma was composed of 11 years: five years in primary school, three years in preparatory school, and three years in
secondary school. Following the elimination of grade 6, two cohorts of primary school graduated simultaneously and
entered the middle school together in 1989.
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exogenous variation in education to explore its impact on fertility (Amin & Behrman, 2014;
Cygan-Rehm & Maeder, 2013; McCrary & Royer, 2011; Monstad, Propper, & Salvanes, 2008).
To examine the effect of education on fertility, I focus on three outcomes: the number of
children ever born, ideal number of children, and age at first birth. I use a nonparametric
regression discontinuity (RD) design. In particular, I estimate kernel-based local linear
regression models for education and fertility. I also carry out a complementary analysis using
local exponential mean regression models for count responses. The data for this study come
from the recent seven waves of the Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (1992,
1995, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2014). The total sample size for the six waves is 97,314 evermarried women of reproductive age. The DHS data provides rich information on fertility history
and socioeconomic and demographics factors. Most importantly, for the purpose of this study,
the data provides information about the year and month of birth of each woman so that one can
identify which woman attended which primary school system.
This paper contributes to the growing literature that examines the causal effect of
education on fertility. In particular, using a change in the length of primary schooling in Egypt, I
estimate the causal effect of female education on fertility in the context of a developing country.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use this natural experiment to create an
exogenous variation in education in Egypt. The results show that women who faced the six-year
primary system had completed in adulthood, on average, one more year of schooling in
comparison to women who had faced the five-year primary system. Using this variation in
education, my results show that each year of female education reduces the number of children
born per woman by 0.104 children. That is, a woman with nine years of compulsory education
has about one less child than a woman with no formal education. The results also show that the
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reduction in number of children seem to result from postponing maternal age rather than a
change in women’s attitudes and preferences. In particular, I found that each year of female
education postpones maternal age by 1.8 to 2.8 months, with no significant impact on women’s
ideal number of children. I also provide evidence that the delay of maternal age results from
delaying marriage rather than increasing women’s labor force participation or increasing their
usages of contraceptive methods. Second, contrary to almost all empirical studies of developing
countries that used a single-year household survey data, access to seven waves of relatively
richer pooled cross-sectional data facilitates the application of regression discontinuity design as
well as carrying out the ensuing robustness checks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing
literature on education and fertility and briefly discusses the change in the length of primary
schooling in Egypt. Section 3 describes the EDHS data. Section 4 explains the regression
discontinuity design. In section 5, I present the results of this chapter dividing them into baseline
results ignoring the endogeneity and the main results of the RD analysis. Section 6 provides
robustness checks. Section 7 investigates the channels through which female education affects
fertility. Finally, section 8 provides the conclusion.
2. Background
I first summarize the theoretical background on the relationship between female
education and fertility before turning to the review of the empirical literature. I then provide
further details about the change in the length of primary education in Egypt.
Standard economic theory has ambiguous predictions about the relationship between
female education and fertility. According to the substitution effect, a high level of education
increases the opportunity cost of childbearing through enhancing women’s labor market
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outcomes (Becker, 1960). Becker and Lewis (1973) also highlighted that more educated parents
tend to invest more in children’s human capital, resulting in increases in the cost of fertility per
child. Moreover, education may reduce the cost of avoiding pregnancy because more educated
women tend to be more efficient in using contraceptive methods (Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1989).
On the other hand, higher education also has an income effect that may lead to the opposite
conclusion. Highly educated women tend to have more earnings and hence can afford to have
more children assuming children are normal goods. Another channel of the income effect,
introduced by Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), is that a highly educated woman tends to be
matched with a highly educated partner, resulting in increased family income that allows having
more children.
In addition to income and substitution effects, Jejeebhoy (1995) emphasizes the role of
cultural context in the relationship between education and fertility. She argues that education
improves a woman’s autonomy through improving her social and economic self-reliance and
hence enables her to make her own decisions. However, the power of education in enhancing a
woman’s autonomy is largely dependent on the contextual factors and woman’s position in
society. For instance, in societies with wide gender disparities, small amounts of education may
have a negligible impact on a woman’s autonomy and hence a weaker effect on fertility.
Whether the substitution effect dominates the income effect, and under which cultural
context, remains largely an empirical question. A considerable number of empirical studies have
been published in the past three decades to examine the impact of education on fertility.
Empirical studies of developing countries have documented a negative association between
education and fertility. These studies examined a broad range of countries such as several Arab
countries (Al-Qudsi, 1998), Sierra Leone (Balley, 1989), Egypt (Cochrane et al., 1990), Jamaica
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(Handa, 2000), Brazil (Lam & Duryea, 1999), and Latin American (Martin, 1995). Nearly all
these studies did not adequately control for confounding variables, such as women ability,
preferences, and family background that are expected to affect both education and fertility.
Therefore, endogeneity remains a grave concern in the studies of developing countries, and so
their results can be best regarded as partial correlations rather than causal impacts.
In an attempt to account for endogeneity, few recent studies have used governmental
education reforms to create exogenous variations in education. In particular, Osili and Long
(2008) used the Universal Primary Education (UPE) program in Nigeria as a natural experiment
to estimate the impact of education on fertility. The UPE program provided tuition-free primary
education and constructed new schools. The program had been heavily implemented in the states
where educational facilities were initially low. The authors exploited the variation in funds
distributed to each region to create an exogenous change in education. Using data from the 1999
Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey, they found that the UPE program had significantly
increased female education and reduced fertility. Similar methodology and results were obtained
by Breierova and Duflo (2004) using a massive school construction program in Indonesia during
1973-78 and data from the 1995 intercensul survey of Indonesia.
Recent studies of developed countries have exploited exogenous variations in education
to establish a causal relationship between education and fertility. The most common exogenous
variation used in this literature is the change in education policy. For instance, in 1959, Norway
extended the number of compulsory years of schooling from seven to nine years. Monstad et al.
(2008) exploited the time and regional variations in the program intensity as an instrumental
variable. They found that extending compulsory education increased the years of schooling
women attained, but there is no evidence that more education resulted in more women remaining
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childless or having fewer children. Using a similar policy change in West Germany between
1958 and 1969 which extended the compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 years, Cygan-Rehm and
Maeder (2013) found that education reduced the number of children born per woman. McCrary
and Royer (2011) used data from California and Texas to examine the effect of education on
fertility for mothers born just before and after the school entry date. They found that women who
enter school earlier tend to have more schooling years than women who begin later; however,
there are no significant differences between them in fertility outcomes. Amin and Behrman
(2014) found opposite results using twins data from Minnesota and applying twins fixed effects.
There is no consensus among the studies of developed countries on the impact of female
education on fertility. Additionally, the socioeconomic and cultural contexts differ dramatically
between developed and developing countries, which are expected to play important roles in the
relationship between female education and fertility (Jejeebhoy, 1995). Therefore, one cannot
generalize results from developed countries, if any, for the developing countries. The studies by
Osili and Long (2008) and Breierova and Duflo (2004) attempted to handle the endogeneity of
education in the case of developing countries using government reforms as sources of exogenous
variations in education. There are some concerns, however, about using government programs as
a source of exogenous variation as highlighted by Meyer (1995). Governments do not usually
assign their programs randomly across regions. The characteristics of regions are taken into
consideration. Additionally, political factors such as the election system and the level of
corruption play crucial roles in developing countries regarding the amount of funds distributed to
each region.
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This chapter estimates the causal impact of female education on fertility in one of the
Middle Eastern countries, Egypt, using the elimination of the sixth grade in 1989-88 as a source
of exogenous variation in education (law No.233 of 1988).2 Before the policy change, students
attended a total of 12 years toward completing their high school diploma. After the policy
change, students attended a total of 11 years toward completing their high school diploma3.
The first school cohort subjected to the five-year primary system was born on or after
October 1977. I use a regression discontinuity approach to compare education and fertility of
adult women born close to October 1977 but attended different primary school systems. The
change in the length of primary schooling in Egypt provides a good opportunity to explore the
causal impact of female education on fertility in developing countries for several reasons. First,
the five-year primary system was mandatory and universal all over the country, so households
were not able to let their children attend different primary school systems. Another reason is that
the switch to the five-year primary system was announced by the government in June 1988 and
was immediately applicable to children who were about 11 years old at that time. Thus, it is
unlikely that parents would have anticipated that change and adjusted their fertility behaviors
accordingly4.

2

There is no single explanation as to why the Egyptian government had implemented this change. Most of the
evidences on that reform are drawn from the newspapers at that time. One of the reasons highlighted by some
governmental officials is that the purpose of the policy change was to reduce the burden on the average Egyptian
household by reducing their out-of-pocket spending on primary education. Another reason that was mentioned is that
the policy change was a step to cope up with educational systems in developed countries that were claimed to
implement an 11-year rather than 12-year pre-university system. The most common explanation, however, for the
reduction in primary school years is that, by the mid-1980s, Egyptian elementary schools suffered from a shortage of
classroom space because of large enrollments of children in the elementary schools. This problem led the government
to shorten the length of the primary education from six to five years to save sixth-grade classrooms to absorb the large
enrollment in the first grade.
3
It is worth mentioning that starting in 2000 the number of years in primary school was changed back to six years.
The first cohort who faced this change has not shown up yet in the DHS survey. The reverse change in 2000 was
motivated by the government's desire to ensure that children spend enough time in primary school to get better
education.
4
Section 6 of this chapter tests for differences in baseline characteristics among women born right before and right
after October 1977 and finds no evidence of significant differences.
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3. Data
This chapter uses the seven recent waves of the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey
(EDHS): 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2014. Each wave of the survey covers evermarried women of reproductive age (15-49)5. I focus my analysis on women age over 21 years to
reduce the censoring in fertility variables, and because it is more likely that women would have
completed their education by that age 6. The total sample size for the seven waves is 97,314
women. The survey provides information about three fertility outcomes: the number of children
ever born per woman, the preferred (ideal) number of children, and the age of each woman when
she delivered her first child. The sample size differs across these variables. All the women in the
sample (97,314 women) answered the question about the total number of children ever born to
them. Of these women, 6,416 reported having no children at the time of the survey. The
remaining 90,898 women in the sample who did report having children reported their ages at the
time of their first birth. All the women in the sample were also asked about their preferred (ideal)
number of children. There were 84,849 women able to provide a numerical response to this
question.
Information about women’s education is also available in the survey. The survey asked
women about their completed educational levels and grades. For instance, if a woman mentioned
that she left school after the second grade of preparatory school level (middle school), then I
compute her attended years of schooling as follows: six years primary if she was born before
October 1977 (five years if she was born on or after October 1977) + two years in preparatory

5

My analysis is focused on the sample of ever-married women since only for this sample does the Egypt DHS collect
detailed information on fertility as well as the respondent's birth month and year, which is necessary for the RD
strategy. In Section 6 below, I examine the potential sample selection bias that may arise due to the exclusion of nevermarried women.
6
Women in Egypt are less likely to return school after leaving it, especially married women. The survey asked women
whether they were attending school at the time of the survey. Less than 0.1 percent of the women have reported
attending school at the time of the survey.
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school = 8 years of schooling (7 years if she was born on or after October 1977). Additionally,
the survey includes demographic and socioeconomic information. The questionnaires and other
information about the survey are available in the recent EDHS report (Ministry of Health and
Population [Egypt], El-Zanaty and Associates [Egypt], & ICF International, 2015).
Figure 1 depicts the trends in the fertility rate and the average years of schooling of
women during 1992-2014. As can be seen from the graph, the average number of children born
per woman has been declining over time from 4.2 in 1992 to 2.9 in 2014. During the same
period, the average years of education of women has increased from 4.3 in 1992 to 8.3 in 2014.
Thus, from a time series data perspective, there is a negative correlation between education and
fertility over time. Figure 2 depicts the same relationship using cross-sectional data for women of
completed fertility for each year separately. This chapter examines whether this negative
correlation is a causal relationship.

Figure 1: Average numbers of children born per woman and average years of education
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Figure 2: Average number of children born per woman and years of education (age 40-49)

Table 1 provides means and standard deviations of fertility and education variables.
Women in the full sample completed, on average, about 6.2 years of schooling and have 3.5
children. The sample of mothers in column 2 seems to be slightly less educated compared to the
full sample in the first column. The average age of a mother at the birth of her first child is about
21.1 years. The last column provides descriptive statistics for the third fertility outcome: the ideal
number of children. The sample in this column includes women who were able to provide
numerical responses for their ideal numbers of children. These women seem to be more educated
compared to the full sample. Their average ideal number of children is three kids (less than the
actual number of children born per woman).
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Table 1: Means and (Standard Deviations) for Fertility and Education Variables
Variables
Number of children
Age at birth
Ideal number of
born per woman
(Mothers’ Sample)
children
Fertility Outcome
3.500
21.108
3.027
(2.333)
(4.120)
(1.441)
Education
6.245
6.132
6.689
(5.862)
(5.837)
(5.865)
Observations
97,314
90,898
84,849
EDHS data (1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2014). The number of children born is based on the actual number
of children born per woman at the time of the survey. Age at first birth is the age of a mother when she delivered her
first child. The ideal number of children is a woman’s preferred number of children.

4. Methodology
This section describes the RD design I use to estimate the impact of female education on
fertility.7 I employ a nonparametric RD approach exploiting the reduction in the length of
primary schooling in Egypt in 1988-89 from six to five years as a source of exogenous variation
in education.
The first school cohort who was subject to the five-year primary system were the children
who were in their fifth grade during the academic year 1988-89 (September 1988 – May 1989).
Given that a child has to turn six before October 1 to enter school in Egypt, this implies that
children who were in their fifth grade in the school year 1988-89 were born between October 1,
1977 and September 30, 1978. Therefore, October 1977 represents a cutoff date such that
individuals born before that date had to attend one more year of primary schooling.
A standard linear RD model for the fertility outcomes for woman i can be specified as:
𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛼3 (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛼4 𝐷𝑖 ∗ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛼5 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,

(1)

where 𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 refers to three outcomes: the number of children ever born to woman i, the
ideal number of children of woman i, and the age of woman i at her first birth; 𝑋𝑖 is the forcing

7

See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a comprehensive review of the RD approach.
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variable which is woman 𝑖’s date of birth (expressed in year of birth and month of birth). Here 𝑐
refers to the cutoff date at October 1977. Hence, (𝑋𝑖 − 𝐶) denotes a woman’s date of birth
relative to October 1977. For instance, if woman 𝑖 was born on October 1978, the value of her
(𝑋𝑖 − 𝐶) would be 12 months. In Equation (1), 𝐷𝑖 is an indicator variable for being born at or
after the cutoff date (𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝐶), 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 is the age of woman 𝑖 at the time of the survey (I control for
age for fertility outcomes other than age at first birth(, and 𝜀𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term.
If female education is a binary variable that is determined solely by the type of primary
schooling (five-year versus six-year systems), then the parameter 𝛼2 in Equation (1) would
identify the causal impact of education on fertility. This applies to the case of a sharp RD design
where the probability of treatment jumps from zero to one when the forcing variable crosses the
cutoff. In this chapter, the total years of education of adult women is a continuous variable that
may be affected by the type of primary education system as well as other factors. Hence, a fuzzy
RD design is more appropriate in this case. The discontinuity in education (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 ) is modeled
similar to Equation (1) as follows, where 𝜈𝑖 is the equation error term.
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3 (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛽4 𝐷𝑖 ∗ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖 ,

(2)

In the fuzzy RD design, the impact of female education on fertility can be computed as
the ratio of the reduced form estimate of discontinuity in fertility, 𝛼2 , to the reduced form
estimate of discontinuity in education, 𝛽2, provided that the same bandwidth (discussed below) is
used to estimate Equations (1) and (2). Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) showed that the
ratio of the two RD gaps, 𝛼2 /𝛽2 , is numerically identical to 𝛿2 in the following local two-stageleast- squares (2SLS) system using the binary variable 𝐷𝑖 as an instrument for education8:

8

The equality between the Local 2SLS estimate of 𝛿2 and the ratio of the two RD gaps, 𝛼2 /𝛽2 , requires using the same
bandwidth in estimating Equations (1)-(4). I follow the recommendation of Imbens and Lemieux (2008) to use the
same bandwidth of the outcome equation.
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𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛿1 + 𝛿2 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿3 (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛿4 𝐷𝑖 ∗ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛿5 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀 2𝑖 ,

(3)

𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾3 (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛾4 𝐷𝑖 ∗ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛾5 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜈2𝑖 .

(4)

Following the literature on local RD approach by Hahn et al. (2001), I estimate these
equations using kernel-based local linear regressions9. This nonparametric setting uses a
weighted linear regression with weights computed using a kernel function, such that
observations far from the cutoff date get smaller weights than observations near the cutoff date.
(𝑥−𝑐)

The weighting function I use is based on the triangle kernel K(.) = max {0, 1 − |

ℎ

|} similar to

McCrary & Royer (2011), where ℎ is the bandwidth.
I implemented both the plug-in rules method (Imbens & Kalyanaraman, 2012) and crossvalidation procedure to compute the bandwidth, h. Each of these bandwidth selectors, however,
chooses a bandwidth that is quite large (it ranges from h=80 to h=100). I chose a smaller
bandwidth of 60 months throughout this study. A bandwidth of 60 months allows, to some
extent, to control for cohort effects by focusing the analysis within a 10-year birth cohort. As
discussed below, the estimates are, however, quite robust to the bandwidth sizes within a
reasonable interval of the chosen bandwidth.
One concern about the previous setup is that the number of children outcomes (the
number of children ever born and the ideal number of children) are count variables and hence the
local linear model might not fit the data in this case. To account for the nonlinearity of these
outcomes, I also estimate local Poisson, more precisely local (nonlinear) exponential, regression

9

One possible concern is that the forcing variable, the normalized date of birth, is measured in months, which is a
discrete variable. Lee and Card (2008) argued that the local linear regression is not suitable in this case as it is not
possible to compare outcomes very close to the cutoff date as the bandwidth can never be shrunk to zero. According
to them, one should use global polynomial models with discrete forcing variables. Lee and Lemieux (2010), however,
pointed out that even in the case of continuous variables researchers usually use data far from the cutoff date.
Therefore, in this essay I estimate local linear regression models following other studies (McCrary & Royer, 2011).

18

models for these outcomes. The expected outcome, conditional on observed and unobserved
heterogeneity components, is specified as
𝐸(𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 |. ) = exp[𝜆1 + 𝜆2 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 + 𝜆3 (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝜆4 𝐷𝑖 ∗ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝜆5 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 ]𝜉𝑖 , (5)
where 𝜉𝑖 is the unobserved heterogeneity component. The error function that is the basis of
generalized method of moments estimation can be specified as10
𝜁𝑖 = [𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 / exp[−𝜆1 − 𝜆2 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 − 𝜆3 (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) − 𝜆4 𝐷𝑖 ∗ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) − 𝜆5 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 ]] − 1. (6)
Analogous to the case of local linear RD approach, I employ weighted local exponential mean
regression with weights estimated using a triangle kernel function. The variable 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 is modeled
similar to Equation (4) above.

5. Results
5.1. Baseline Results

This section replicates the results of the previous studies on developing countries when
ignoring the endogeneity of education. In particular, I estimate Poisson models for the number of
children outcomes and a linear model for the outcome of age at childbearing. In this section, I
use six waves of the EDHS survey: 1995, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2014. I exclude the 1992
survey round because the wealth index, one of the primary control variables, is not available in
this round11. The total sample of the six rounds is 88,426 ever-married women age between 22
and 49 (the sample for the outcome of age at first birth is 82,571 women; while, the sample for
the outcome of the ideal number of children is 77,669 women).

10

See Mullahy (1997) and Wooldridge (2010) (Section 18.5) for details on GMM estimation of the basic exponential
model with endogeneity.
11
The 1992 round will be included in the total sample of the RD analysis. However, as explained in subsection 5.2.2
below, because the RD approach uses only a local sample within a chosen bandwidth, the exclusion of the 1992 round
does not affect the RD results. Therefore, the findings from the RD analysis can be compared to the findings in this
section.
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Table 2 below provides means of key socioeconomic and demographic variables of that
sample. The average number of children born per woman and the average years of education in
this sample is very close to the full sample of Table 1 (3.43 and 6.44 compared to 3.50 and 6.25,
respectively in Table 1). Women with 7 or more children have as low as 1.38 years of education
on average; whereas, women who have only 1 or 2 children have 8.91 years. More than 70
percent of women with 7 or more children have no formal education, and almost none of them
has a college degree. On the other hand, 24 percent of women with only one or two children has
a college degree. Table 2 also shows that women with more children tend to live in rural areas
and poor households compared to women with fewer children.

Table 2: Means of Main Variables for all Women by Number of Children
Child
7&
Full
Standard
Variables
1-2
3-4
5-6
-less
above sample deviation
Current age
30.26 29.91
35.26
38.70 41.87 34.45
7.85
Number of Children
0.00
1.65
3.41
5.39
8.27
3.43
2.28
Education years
7.98
8.91
6.83
3.16
1.38
6.44
5.88
Has no education=1
0.28
0.20
0.33
0.57
0.73
0.48
0.50
Primary education=1
0.12
0.11
0.16
0.23
0.22
0.07
0.25
Secondary education=1
0.36
0.45
0.37
0.17
0.04
0.33
0.47
College & above=1
0.24
0.24
0.14
0.03
0.01
0.12
0.33
Urban=1
0.48
0.52
0.47
0.33
0.24
0.44
0.50
Use contraception=1
0.76
0.94
0.96
0.94
0.88
0.93
0.26
st
1 wealth quintile=1
0.16
0.13
0.17
0.29
0.40
0.20
0.40
2nd wealth quintile=1
0.17
0.15
0.18
0.24
0.27
0.19
0.39
3rd wealth quintile =1
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.20
0.19
0.19
0.39
th
4 wealth quintile=1
0.22
0.23
0.21
0.16
0.11
0.20
0.40
th
5 wealth quintile =1
0.27
0.30
0.25
0.11
0.04
0.22
0.42
Observations

5,855

27,926

31,874

13,717

9,054

88,426

-

EDHS data (1995, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2014). This table excludes the 1992 survey round because the wealth
index is not available in this survey wave.
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Table 3 reports average marginal effects (AMEs) of female education on three fertility
outcomes: number of children born per woman, age at childbearing, and the number of children
preferred. The first specification (Spec 1) controls for religion (Muslim versus Christian) which
shrinks the sample to 65,959 women because religion is missing in two survey rounds: 2000 and
2003. In the second specification (Spec 2) I exclude religion and run the regression on the same
sample as Spec 1. In Specification 3 (Spec 3), I exclude religion and run the regression on the
full sample (88,426 women). In all the specifications, I control for age at the time of the survey,
age at the time of survey squared, marital duration, a set of dummy variables for years of birth, a
dummy variable for contraception usage, a dummy for urban region, and a set of dummy
variables for household wealth quintiles.
As can be seen from the results, excluding religion has a slight effect on the results. This
can be explained by the fact that 95 percent of the Egyptian population are Muslims. This
percentage is almost the same across all the fertility groups, indicating that religion may have
little explanatory power in fertility behavior.
I focus my discussion on the results given by Spec 3 as the preferred set of estimates.
Panel (a) shows the results of the effect of education on the number of children born per woman.
Other factors held constant, each year of female education reduces the number of children born
per woman by 0.08 children. This estimate is statistically significant at 99 percent confidence
level. This result is consistent with previous studies of developing countries that ignored
endogeneity. In particular, my estimate is comparable with Balley (1989), Al-Qudsi (1998),
Handa (2000), and Bhargava (2007).12

12

The unadjusted data before including regressors is modestly overdispersed with variance- mean ratio of about 1.6.
I have tested the model for overdispersion after inclusion of explanatory variables. This overdispersion is eliminated
upon inclusion of regressors. I found some evidence of moderate underdispersion and hence a negative binomial model
is not appropriate in this case. I have also estimated a censored Poisson regression model allowing for right censoring
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Panel (b) shows the impact of female education on age at childbearing. As can be seen
from the table, each year of female education postpones the maternal age by 0.276 years (3.3
months), other factors held constant. The last panel shows that more educated women prefer to
have fewer children compared to less educated women. In particular, each year of female
education reduces the number of children preferred by 0.02 children. As can be seen, the effect
of education on the actual number of children is four times bigger than the effect of education on
women’s fertility preferences. These effects are all statistically at 99 percent confidence level.

Table 3: AME of Female Education on Fertility Outcomes: Baseline Regressions
Variables
Spec 1
Spec 2
Spec 3
(a) Number of Children
Estimate
Standard error
Control for religion
Observations

-0.072***
(0.001)
Yes
65,959

-0.072***
(0.001)
No
65,959

-0.078***
(0.001)
No
88,426

(b) Age at First Birth
Estimate
Standard error
Control for religion
Observations

0.269***
(0.003)
Yes
61,499

0.270***
(0.003)
No
61,499

0.276***
(0.003)
No
82,571

(c) Ideal Number of Children
Estimate
Standard error
Control for religion
Observations

-0.018***
(0.001)
Yes
60,150

-0.018***
(0.001)
No
60,150

-0.019***
(0.001)
No
77,669

This table is estimated using the EDHS data (six waves). Women age 22-49. In all the specifications, I control for
age at the time of the survey (except for age at first birth outcome), age at the time of survey squared, a set of
dummies for years of birth, marriage duration, a dummy variable for contraception usage, a dummy for the region,
and a set of dummies for household wealth quintiles. Heteroskedasticty-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *
refers to 90 percent confidence level, ** refers to 95 percent confidence level, and *** refers to 99 percent
confidence level.

in the number of children due to the age of the mother. The results are qualitatively similar to simply including
quadratic in age in the regular Poisson regression model.
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5.2. Regression Discontinuity Results
5.2.1 Graphical Representation

I start the RD analysis by a graphical representation for years of education and fertility
outcomes over the support of the normalized forcing variable (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐) (date of birth relative to
October 1977). These graphs are shown in Figure 3 below. The dots in these figures represent
unconditional means outcome within a one-month bandwidth; whereas, the solid lines represent
fitted regression lines from 3rd order global polynomial regressions.
Figure 3 shows that there is a discontinuity in years of education completed in adulthood
at the cutoff date. Particularly, there is a decrease in years of education completed by women
born after October 1977 who attended five years in primary school compared to women born
before October 1977 who attended the six-year primary system. Figure 3 also shows some
discontinuous increase in the number of children born per woman. Therefore, women who
attended less time in primary school and have lower educational attainment in adulthood appear
to have more children compared to women who attended more time in primary school. The
figure does not, however, show, any discontinuity in the preferred number of children. Finally,
Figure 3 shows that there is some discontinuous decrease at the cutoff date in the average age at
childbearing among women born after October 1977 who attended less time in primary
schooling.
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Figure 3: Discontinuities in Years of Education and Fertility Outcomes

5.2.2. Main Results from the RD Analysis
This section discusses the estimates from the nonparametric regression discontinuity
regressions. I estimate local linear regression as well as local exponential mean regression
models using the triangular kernel weighting function within a bandwidth of 60 months. Table 4
below reports the average marginal effects of female education from the local linear regression
model (column 1) and the local exponential mean regression model (local Poisson) (column 2).
Panel (a) of Table 4 shows that the estimate of discontinuity in education is negative and
significant. In particular, women who attended five years in primary school have completed, on
average, 0.89 less years of schooling than women who attended six years in primary school.
Panel (b) shows the causal impact of female education on fertility using this exogenous
variation in education. The local linear model in panel (b.1) shows that the effect of female
24

education on the number of children born per woman is - 0.06. That is, other factors held
constant, each year of female education reduces the number of children born per woman by 0.06.
The P-value of this coefficient is 0.12, which makes it statistically significant at 0.88 percent
confidence level. As discussed before, the number of children outcome is a count variable, and
hence, a local Poisson regression is more appropriate than a local linear regression. I focus the
discussion on the results of the local Poisson models as my preferred set of estimates. As can be
seen, using a local Poisson model increases the magnitude of the education coefficient from 0.06
to 0.10 and enhances its statistical significance to 99 percent confidence level.
Panel (b.2) shows the impact of female education on age at childbearing. An extra year of
female education increases the age at childbearing by 0.15 years (1.8 months), other factors held
constant. This effect is not however statistically significant at the conventional confidence levels
(P-value equals 0.18). The result in panel (b.3) shows that the increase in female education does
not change women’ preference for their ideal number of children. This finding is true using both
the local linear and the local Poisson regressions.
To make the RD results comparable to the results from the baseline regression in Table 3,
I run the RD analysis after excluding the 1992 survey. Consistent with the discussion in footnote
11, excluding the 1992 survey does not affect the RD results. The reason is that my RD analysis
uses a 60-month bandwidth, which restricts the regression sample (local sample) to women born
within five years interval on both sides from October 1977. That is, the RD local sample includes
women born between October 1972 and October 1982. Women surveyed in 1992 were born
between 1943 and 1970 and hence do not appear in the RD local sample. Therefore, the findings
from this section can be compared to the baseline results in section 5.1. As can be seen, the effect
of female education on the number of children born using the RD analysis (kernel-based local
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Poisson model) is higher than the estimated effect from the baseline Poisson in Table 3 (0.10
versus 0.08). The estimated effect using the RD analysis, however, is smaller than the effects in
recent studies of developing countries that attempted to create exogenous variations in female
education and examined its impact on fertility. In particular, Osili and Long (2008) found that
increasing female education by one year reduces fertility by 0.26 births.
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Table 4: The Effects of Female Education on Fertility: RD Results
Local Linear

Local Poisson (for count
dependent variable)

(a) Discontinuity in education
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local Sample

-0.892
(0.148)
[0.000]
{6.245}
26,673

-

(b) Effect of female education
1) Number of children born
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local sample

-0.060
(0.038)
[0.116]
{3.500}
26,673

-0.104
(0.041)
[0.010]
{3.500}
26,673

2) Age at birth (in years)
Estimate
Standard error.
P-value
Mean
Local sample

0.149
(0.11)
[0.175]
{21.108}
24,480

-

3) Ideal number of children
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local sample

0.025
(0.038)
[0.507]
{3.027}
24,744

0.028
(0.049)
[0.561]
{3.027}
24,744

Outcomes

This table is estimated using the EDHS data (seven waves), women age 22-49. I estimate local regression models
with a triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 60 months. Standard errors are clustered by primary sampling unit. In all
the regressions, I control for age at the time of the survey for fertility outcomes except age at first birth.
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6. Robustness checks
This section reports some robustness checks to the main results in Table 4. Specifically, I
examine whether the findings are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth, test for discontinuities in
baseline characteristics, investigate whether husband education biases the RD results, explore the
effects among actual treated and control groups, and finally explore potential threats of sample
selection bias.
6.1. Sensitivity to Bandwidth

As indicated earlier, I use a bandwidth of 60 months, which is smaller than the optimum
bandwidth suggested by the plug-in and the cross-validation methods. Although this restricts the
analysis within a 10-year birth cohort (60 months on each side of the cutoff date), there are some
concerns about the extent to which the results are sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth.
Figure 4 displays the 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimates of Table 4 for a broad
range of bandwidths. Panel (a) shows that the estimate of discontinuity in education is quite
stable over the bandwidth. Except for bandwidths less than 20 months, the magnitude of this
estimate ranges from 0.7 to 0.9. Increasing the bandwidth appears to enhance the efficiency of
the estimate (through increasing the local sample size), but it does not seem to have a big effect
on the magnitude. Panels (b) and (c) show the 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimated
coefficient of female education on the number of children born and the ideal number of children,
respectively, using the local Poisson models. Likewise, these graphs show that increasing the
bandwidth has a minor impact on the magnitude of the coefficients. The last panel shows the
confidence interval for the estimated impact of female education on age at childbearing. As can
be seen from the graph, the estimated impact ranges from 0.1 to 0.3, and it is statistically
significant at bandwidths bigger than 60 months.
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Figure 4: 95% Confidence Interval for the Estimated Effects of Education on Fertility

6.2. Discontinuities in Baseline Characteristics

One of the central assumptions of the RD approach is that women born around the cutoff
date share similar baseline characteristics. A violation of this assumption would imply that
women near the cutoff did not randomly attend different primary schooling systems, and the
results of the RD analysis would be biased. As was argued in the introduction, the first school
cohort who was subject to the new five-year primary system was born 11 years before the
government announced the change in the system. Thus, it is not possible that parents would have
anticipated this change 11 years before it happened and adjusted their behaviors as a result.
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I test for evidence of non-randomness around the cutoff date by estimating the
discontinuities in baseline characteristics such as a woman’s religion (Muslim or Christian), type
of region (urban or rural), her mother’s years of education, and her father’s years of education.
The data is not equally available for each of these variables. The region variable is available for
all the women in the sample (97,314 women). It is based on the region of residence rather than
the region where a woman obtained her primary schooling. However, the mobility in Egypt is
quite small13, and women are more likely to move within the same type of region. The religion
variable is missing in two survey years: 2000 and 2003, which reduces the sample size to 74,847
women. Both mother’s education and father’s education contain many missing values, which
shrinks the sample size to 5,813women and 3,493 women, respectively.
Table 26 in Appendix A shows the estimation results from a set of separate local linear
regressions in the form of Equation (1) where each of the baseline covariate represents the
dependent variable. If the assumption of the RD holds, these baseline covariates should evolve
continuously around the cutoff date and hence the estimates of the discontinuity should not be
statistically significant. The results show that there are no significant discontinuities in these
baseline covariates.

13

I used data from the Egypt Population, Housing, and Establishment Census 1996 and 2006 to compute the
proportions of internal migrations from rural to urban areas and vice versa. The tabulations are shown in Table 25 in
Appendix A. I restrict my computation to individuals of the same age group of 22-49 consistent with the analysis in
this chapter. The data show that the percentage of rural-urban migration is very small, and ranges from 1.6 percent in
1996 to 2.8 percent in 2006. Similarly, the percentage of urban-rural migration ranges from 2.5 percent in 1996 to 1.2
percent in 2006. These percentages are quite small compared to developed countries such as the United States. In fact,
in the United States, among those who live in a different state than their birth state, roughly 35 percent of the 18-34
years-old s have moved across states lines in the last five years (averaging across the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses)
(Molloy, Smith, & Wozniak, 2011).
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6.3. Controlling for Husband Education
It is not a priori clear whether one should control for husband’s education in the
regression of female education on fertility. Without the inclusion of husband’s education, the
effect of women’s education represents both the direct impact of women’s education and the
indirect impact of husband’s education, which is due to assortative mating effects (Behrman &
Rosenzweig, 2002; Holmlund, Lindahl, & Plug, 2011). Thus, the inclusion of the husband’s
education in the regression will exclude assortative mating effects from the effect of female
education on fertility.
The problem with my natural experiment setting, however, is that the change in the
length of primary schooling had simultaneous effects on both women and men. Isolating an
exogenous variation in female education may not, therefore, be possible. The cultural context in
Egypt, however, provides a natural setting for controlling for husband’s education and isolating
the exogenous variation in women’s education. In particular, most men in Egypt marry women
younger than they are. This is confirmed by Table 5, which shows the joint distribution of
lengths of primary schooling systems for both women and their husbands within a 60-month
bandwidth. As can be seen, the majority of women in the sample are married to men who
attended the old six-year primary system (older men), regardless of women’s types of primary
schooling. Therefore, in my analysis, I compare women on both sides of the cutoff (six-year
primary vs. five-year primary) where the type of primary schooling attended by husbands is
mostly the same on both sides.
In Table 27 in Appendix A, I reproduce the outputs of Table 4 in the text where I add
husband’s education to the set of the control variables. The purpose of this exercise is to explore
the relative importance of husband’s education in the relationship between woman’s education
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and fertility. The results of this analysis show that controlling for husband’s education does not
change the main findings from Table 4. Specifically, female education reduces the number of
children born per woman and increases the age at childbearing. The latter impact remains
statistically insignificant within a 60-month bandwidth.

Table 5: The Joint Distribution of Primary Schooling Length for Women and their Husbands
Husbands attended six
Husbands attended
years
five years
Total
Women attended six years
13,961
521
14,482
(%)
(96.4)
(3.6)
(100)
Women attended five years
(%)

10,074
(79.57)

2,587
(20.43)

12,661
(100)

This table is computed by the authors using seven waves (1992-2014) of the DHS survey. Row percentages are
shown in parentheses.

6.4. Restricting the Sample to Actual Treated and Control Groups

So far, the RD analysis of this chapter has included all women regardless of their
education levels. Women born before October 1977 are considered the control group (attended
the six-year primary system); whereas, women born on or after October 1977 are considered the
treated group (attended the new five-year primary system). However, a considerable portion of
women in the sample has no formal education in addition to women who have dropped out
before completing the primary school degree (37 percent and 10 percent, respectively). These
women had neither faced the six-year primary system nor did they face the new five-primary
system. They are however assigned to one of these systems based on their dates of birth. The
reason for including them in the analysis is to account for the possibility that the decisions of
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women (or their parents) not to go to school or drop out of school may have been affected by the
length of primary schooling. For instance, parents who dropped their children out of the school
or decided not to enroll them in school under the six-year primary system may have decided
differently if they knew the primary school would be five rather than six years. It is not clear
however the significance of this portion in the sample.
The downside from adding these women in the analysis is that it underestimates the
exogenous variation in women’s education. To illustrate, women with no formal schooling are,
on average, older and thus are more likely to be considered among the six-year primary cohort.
Therefore, a considerable portion of women with no educational attainment is counted among
women who attended one extra year of primary. This apparently underestimates the impact of
that extra year of primary schooling on educational attainment. Smaller exogenous variations in
female education may not provide enough variations to identify the effect of female education on
fertility. It may also result in large standard errors rendering the estimated effects statistically
insignificant.
To investigate this issue further, I run the RD analysis in this section on women who had
completed at least a primary school degree. This restricts the total sample to 49,283 women.
These are the women who had actually faced one of the primary schooling systems. I re-estimate
the average marginal effects of Table 4 in Table 6 below using the restricted sample. I draw the
estimated discontinuities in education and fertility outcomes in Figure 16 in Appendix A. I also
draw the estimated coefficients of local regressions across a wide range of bandwidths in Figure
17 in Appendix A. As can be seen from the Table 6 below, restricting the sample to women with
at least primary degree increases the exogenous variation in female education from 0.89 to 1.47.
Figure 17 in Appendix A shows that the exogenous variation is much higher for cohorts born
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close to the cutoff (small bandwidths), and it decreases for cohorts born far from the cutoff
(bigger bandwidths). The exogenous variation in female education, however, remains above one
even at large bandwidths.
Using this exogenous variation, the estimated effect of female education on the number
of children born is negative and statistically significant in both the local linear and the local
Poisson regressions. The magnitude of the coefficient using the local Poisson regressions is 0.08,
which is quite smaller than the estimated impact in Table 4 above using the full sample (0.10).
Figure 17 shows that for bandwidths less than 120 months, the estimated coefficient of the local
Poisson model remains statistically significant and quite stable. Consistent with the findings
from the full sample, female education has no effect on women’s preferences for the ideal
number of children. Finally, the impact of female education on age at childbearing in the
restricted sample is bigger and statistically significant compared to the estimated effect using the
full sample (0.24 versus 0.15 versus). Figure 17 shows that the estimated effect ranges from 0.16
and 0.30 and remains statistically significant across a very broad range of bandwidths. Thus,
increasing the extracted exogenous variation in female education has not substantially altered the
main findings of the RD analysis in Table 4.

34

Table 6: The Effects of Female Education on Fertility: RD Results for the Restricted Sample
Local Poisson (for count
Outcomes
Local Linear
dependent variables)
(a) Discontinuity in education
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local Sample

-1.472
(0.097)
[0.000]
{11.497}
17,269

-

(b) Effect of female education
1) Number of children born
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local sample

-0.046
(0.025)
[0.069]
{2.568}
17,269

-.075
(0.029)
[0.009]
{2.568}
17,269

2) Age at birth (in years)
Estimate
Standard error.
P-value
Mean
Local sample

0.235
(0.078)
[0.002]
{22.504}
15,716

-

3) Ideal number of children
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local sample

-0.009
(0.024)
[0.716]
{2.803}
16,379

-0.003
(0.009)
[0.692]
{2.803}
16,379

This table is estimated using the EDHS data (six waves), women age 22-49. I restrict the sample to women who
completed at least a primary degree. I estimate local linear regression models with a triangular kernel and a
bandwidth of 60 months. Standard errors are clustered by primary sampling unit.
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6.5. Sample Selection Issue

I finally address potential bias that may arise by focusing the study on ever-married
women. Unfortunately, the data for never-married women do not allow me to observe detailed
information on fertility as well as respondent’s birth month and year, which is necessary to
implement the RD strategy. Even if I assume that never-married women have no children, I
cannot include them in the analysis due to the lack of data on date of birth. Hence, the analysis is
focused on the sample of ever-married women since the Egyptian DHS collect detailed
information on fertility as well as the respondent's birth month and year for only these women.
Restricting the analysis to ever-married women is expected to bias the results if education affects
marriage and marriage affects fertility. The direction of the bias, however, is expected to be
downward, as explained below.
The bias equals the product of two terms, which are the effect of being never-married on
fertility and the correlation between education and the probability of being never-married. The
first term is expected to be negative because out-of-wedlock births are rare in Egypt due to
cultural and religious reasons. Like most Arab and Muslim countries, sexual relations outside of
marriage in Egypt are socially prohibited and penalized by the law. There are no official statistics
on the out of wedlock births. Questions on fertility and children outcomes in the Egyptian DHS
survey and other surveys such as Population Census, Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (LMPS),
and the Egyptian Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey (HIES) target
married women only. It is considered very offensive in Egypt to ask an unmarried woman
whether she has any children (Fisher, 2015).
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The second term in the bias equation is expected to be positive as women with higher
levels of education are at a higher risk of being never married compared to less educated women
(Mensch, Singh, & Casterline, 2005). In fact, I computed the average years of education for
never-married women age 22-49 using both the Egypt DHS household member survey (six
rounds) and the Egypt Population, Housing, and Establishment Census 2006. The results are
shown, respectively, in Table 28 and Table 29 in Appendix A. Both datasets show that a young
never-married woman has, on average, more education than an average young ever-married
woman. Figure 18 in Appendix A shows that the majority of never-married women in the DHS
data are young with an average age of 26. Therefore, the bias term is expected to be negative,
and hence, the exclusion of never-married women from the analysis is expected to bias my
results downward. Consequently, my findings using data on ever-married women provide lower
bound estimates of the effects of education on fertility.

7. Explaining the Effect of Female Education on Fertility
The findings of this chapter show that the increase in female education reduces the actual
number of children born per woman with no significant impacts on women’s fertility
preferences. This finding gives rise to the possibility that female education reduces the number
of children born per woman through postponing maternal age, which is confirmed by the results
of the previous sections. In fact, each year of female education delays maternal age by 1.8 to 2.8
months. This section further explores the reasons for postponing childbearing.
The delay of maternal age does not appear to result from enhancing women’s job
opportunities or increasing their usages of contraceptive methods, as suggested in the literature
(Becker, 1960, 1993; Becker & Lewis, 1973). In fact, female labor force participation in Egypt
has been historically low, as can be seen from Figure 5 below, despite the remarkable increase in
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female educational attainment overtime (Figure 1)14. On the other hand, the usage of
contraceptive methods in Egypt has been historically high since the government has expanded
family planning programs and publicity campaigns to curtail population growth in the early
1990s. Figure 5 below shows that the percentage of women using or intending to use
contraceptive methods in the DHS data remained above 80 percent during the period (19922014). To support this argument, Table 7 below show the RD results of the impact of female
education on the probability of work and the probability of using contraceptive methods15. As
can be seen from the first two columns, the increase in female education has no significant
impacts on the probability of work and the probability of using contraceptive methods,
respectively. This finding raises the question as to what might have caused the delay in maternal
age if both the probability of work and the probability of using contraceptive methods have not
affected.
The delay of maternal age appears to result from an additional channel, which has not
been quite emphasized in the previous literature. In particular, the increase in female education
has led to a delay of marriage which resulted in a delay in maternal age16. As can be seen from
the third column of Table 7, each year of female education delays marriage by 0.279 years (3.35

14

Explaining the low levels of female labor force participation in Egypt is out of the scope of this chapter. Assaad and
Krafft (2013) and Hendy (2015) provide a discussion of this issue. In particular, the authors highlight factors related
to the supply of female labor such as family circumstances, women’s preferences, and reservation wages, as well as
factors related to labor demand such as shrinking public sector and discrimination in the private sector.
15
I conduct the fuzzy RD analysis for these two outcomes using local Probit models and using the change in the length
of primary schooling to instrument female education.
16
Other studies have also documented that more-educated women generally marry later than their less-educated
counterparts in Arab countries (Rashad, Osman, & Roudi-Fahimi, 2005). While this could be partially explained by
the fact that more educated women stay longer in the school, a considerable portion of educated women remain
unmarried after leaving school, and some of them do not marry at all. Some studies indicated that returns in the
marriage market, rather than labor market, provide a strong incentive for girls' schooling in Egypt (Lloyd et al., 2003;
Mensch, Ibrahim, Lee, & El-Gibaly, 2003), in that more educated women are expected to marry educated and wealthy
men. This increase in women’s expectations about their future husbands combined with higher poverty levels in
society and increasing the cost of marriage, which is born mostly by grooms, have all contributed to increasing age
at marriage among more educated women.

38

months). This result is statistically significant at 99 confidence level. Given the nature of the
Egyptian society, where out-of-wedlock births are socially prohibited and penalized by the law,
only married women are allowed to have children. Thus, postponing marriage results in
postponing women’s age at first birth (maternal age). In fact, the correlation coefficient between
age at first marriage and age at first birth in the DHS data is 0.9.

Figure 5: Female Labor Force Participation and Contraceptive Usage Overtime

Table 7: The Effects of Female Education on Intermediate Outcomes: RD Results
Pr(work=1)
Pr(use contraceptive=1)
Age at first marriage
Woman Education
0.009
0.003
0.279***
(0.011)
(0.006)
(0.105)
Standard error
(0.432)
(0.645)
(0.008)
P-value
Observations
26,640
26,640
26,640
This table is estimated using the EDHS data (six waves), women age 22-49. I estimate local Probit models for the
first two outcomes and a local linear model for the third outcome. All the regressions use a triangular kernel
weighting function within a bandwidth of 60 months. Standard errors are clustered by primary sampling unit.
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8. Conclusion
Does educating young girls reduce fertility in developing countries? Several empirical
studies have examined this question but have mostly faced difficulties in addressing the
endogeneity of female education. My paper provides causal evidence on the impact of female
education on fertility from a Middle Eastern country. In particular, I use data from the Egyptian
Demographic and Health Survey (1992-2014) to examine the effect of female education on three
fertility outcomes: the actual number of children born per woman, the preferred number of
children per woman, and the age of women at first birth. I use the change in the length of
primary schooling in Egypt in 1988, which reduced the years of primary education from 6 to 5
years, to create an exogenous variation in female education. The first cohort who was subject to
this policy change was individuals who were born on or after October 9177. I implement a
nonparametric regression discontinuity design to compare adulthood education and fertility
outcomes of women born just before and right after October 1977.
The results show that women who attended the five-year primary system have completed,
on average, one less year of schooling in adulthood as compared to women who attended the sixyear primary system. Using this exogenous variation in education, the RD results show that each
year of female education reduces the number of children born per woman by 0.104 children.
That is, a woman with nine years of compulsory education has about one less child than a
woman with no formal education. This estimated effect is statistically significant at the 99
percent confidence level and is much larger than the estimate (0.08) from the baseline Poisson
regression, which ignores the endogeneity of female education.
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I explore whether the estimated effect of education on fertility reflects a change in
women’s preferences towards the optimum number of children. The results of this analysis show
that the increase in female education did not significantly change women’s fertility preferences. I
find, however, that the increase in female education has increased women’s ages at their first
birth. In particular, the results show that each year of female education postponed maternal age
by 1.8 to 2.8 months. Thus, my estimates indicate that the reduction in the number of children
born per women as education increases results from postponing maternal age rather than
changing women’s attitudes and preferences towards the optimum number of children.
I also provide evidence that the delay of maternal age results from delaying marriage
rather than increasing women’s labor force participation or increasing their usages of
contraceptive methods. The results of this chapter are quite robust to several robustness checks
and sample restrictions, including varying the bandwidth, including husband education in the
regression equation, and restricting the analysis to only women who were directly influenced by
the policy change.

41

Chapter II: Parents’ Education and Child Health: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

1. Introduction

In the last few decades a substantial improvement in child health and nutritional status
has been experienced. Since 1990, the number of under-five deaths worldwide has declined from
12.7 million in 1990 to 5.9 million in 2015 (UNICEF, 2015). While that reduction translates into
around 18,000 fewer children dying every day in 2015 than in 1990, it still implies the deaths of
more than 16,000 children under age five every day in 2015. Furthermore, the recent reports by
the UNICEF, WHO, and the World Bank Group estimate that, in 2014, there were 667 million
children under 5 in the world. Of these children, 159 million were stunted, 41 million were
overweight, and 50 million were wasted (UNICEF & WHO & World Bank Group, 2015). The
magnitudes of these estimates are much higher in developing countries than in developed
countries. For instance, children in sub-Saharan Africa are more than 14 times more likely to die
before the age of 5 than children in developed regions (UNICEF, 2015)

.

These persistent challenges to child health represent a growing concern for both
policymakers and academics. In particular, many developing countries, with the technical and
financial assistance of international organizations, have adopted a wide range of policies to
improve child health and reduce mortality such as providing easy and affordable access to
improved water and sanitation. Most of these policies have focused on improving family care
practices through promoting parental education. The focus on family has been motivated by the
recognition that decisions made by parents have substantial impacts on child health. Parents’
decisions determine, among other things, the amount and quality of health care their children
receive, the type of food they eat, and the amount of their physical activities.
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Therefore, improving the quality of parental decisions through ensuring that parents have
adequate education has been promised to improve children’s health outcomes. One of the
possible mechanisms is that education may increase household income and thus allow parents to
invest more resources to improve their children’s health. Additionally, education may provide
parents with general cognitive skills that enhance their capabilities of processing information and
obtaining the health knowledge. Education is also expected to change parental attitudes toward
traditional methods of treating their children's health problems (Glewwe, 1999).
The focus on parental education as an important tool to improve child health not only
reflects the conventional wisdom among policymakers; it has also been supported by an
extensive body of literature in the past three decades. The majority of this research has found that
increasing parental education, especially maternal education, improves child health (Currie,
2009; Grossman, 2006; Strauss & Thomas, 1995). For example, a recent study published in the
British medical journal, the Lancet, and quoted by the Washington Post magazine has shown that
half the reduction in child mortality over the past 40 years can be attributed to increasing female
education (Gakidou, Cowling, Lozano, & Murray, 2010). More specifically, Gakidou et al. have
found that every one-year increase in the average education of women is associated with a 9.5
percent decrease in the child deaths.
The extent, however, to which these estimates reflect causality has remained a challenge,
not least because of the potential endogeneity of parental education. To illustrate, a positive
association between parental education and child health does not necessarily indicate that
parental education causes improvements in child health. Other unobservable factors such as
noncognitive skills, community backgrounds, and time preferences might be responsible for this
observed correlation. For example, Fuchs (1982) argues that individuals who have a high degree
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of time preference for the future invest more in their education and make also larger investment
in their own health and their children health. Thus, ignoring time preference could bias the
effects of schooling on child health.
This chapter attempts to estimate the causal impact of parental education on children’s
health outcomes in Egypt using the same identification strategy of the first chapter. In particular,
I use the change in the length of primary schooling from six to five years in 1988 as the source of
exogenous variation in parental education. Beginning in 1988, the Egyptian government cut the
number of primary school years from six to five years, moving from a 12-year pre-university
system to an 11-year system. This policy change was mandatory throughout the country. The
first school cohort who was subject to this change includes individuals who were born between
October, 1977, and September 1978. Therefore, October 1, 1977 represents a cutoff date such
that individuals born before that date had to attend one more year in primary school compared to
individuals born on or after that date.
I use a nonparametric regression discontinuity analysis to compare parents who were
born close to cutoff date but attended different primary schooling systems. In particular, I
compare adult educational attainments of the five-year and six-year primary school cohorts,
within a reasonable bandwidth of the cutoff date, and relate the difference in their educational
attainment to the difference in their children’s health outcomes.
The data for this study comes from the six recent waves of the Birth Recodes modules of
the Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS) from 1995 until 2014. This data provides
rich information about child health and nutritional status along with other parental
socioeconomic characteristics. For the purpose of this analysis, this data also provides
information about year and month of birth for mothers and fathers so that the length of primary
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schooling attended by each of them can be determined. The results suggest that parental
education has no significant effects on child health. These findings are consistent with
Lindeboom, Llena-Nozal, & van der Klaauw (2009) and McCrary and Royer (2011).
I provide several explanations for the insignificant effects of parental education on child
health. In particular, I argue that the low levels of parental education in Egypt (the average years
of education is 4.6 among mothers and 6 among fathers in the DHS Survey) accompanied with
the poor quality of schooling, especially at the primary level17, result in little effect of education
on parents’ intermediate outcomes that are expected to improve child health such as parents’
literacy skills, access to information, and health behavior. Specifically, I provide evidence that
education has no significant impact on health practices, cognitive skills, or information
processing capabilities of low-educated parents.
This chapter contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, this chapter is one of
few studies that examine the causal impact of parental education on child health in the Middle
Eastern and North African (MENA) region. The lack of evidence for the MENA region is
surprising given the impressive improvements in education in the last few decades (World Bank,
2015; UNICEF, 2015). For example, between 1990 and 2000, literacy rates for the adult
population have increased by 19 percent, from 59 to 78 percent; net enrollment ratio18 in primary
school rose from 62 to 92 percent between 2000 and 2010; and gross enrollment rates in
secondary and higher education increased by threefold and fivefold, respectively, during the
period 1973-2003. During the same period, the region witnessed significant improvements in

17

the quality of primary education in Egypt ranked very low according to the recent Global Competitiveness Report
(World Economic Forum, 20013).
18
Net enrollment ratio is measured as the number of students enrolled in primary school who are of the official age
group for primary school divided by the total population of the same age group.
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child health (World Bank, 2008). Because of these two major developments (rise of education
and improvements in child health), the MENA countries offer a natural setting to test the extent
to which the relationship between parental education and child health is causal.
Second, most of the relevant literature on the effects of parental education on child health
in developing countries focuses on policy interventions that target individuals with relatively
high levels of education to create exogenous variations in parental education. Examples of these
policy interventions include the 1968 expansion of compulsory education in Taiwan from 6 to 9
years (Chou et al., 2010) and the 1980 expansion of secondary education in Zimbabwe (Grépin
and Bharadwaj, 2015). The extent to which interventions targeting individuals with low levels of
education, such as the policy change in Egypt, produce similar effects is unclear. The evidence in
this chapter shows that such interventions seem to have small effects on parental health
knowledge and practices, and therefore, have insignificant effects on child health outcomes.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review for the impact of
parents’ education on child health. Section 3 describes the data used in this study. Section 4
discusses the identification strategy. Section 5 presents the main results. In section 6, I test the
sensitivity of the main results to alternative specifications and sample restrictions. Section 7
explains the insignificant effects of parental education. Section 8 concludes.

2. Literature Review

An extensive body of research has investigated the relationship between parental
education and child health (see Strauss and Thomas (1995); Grossman (2006); Currie (2009)).
Desai and Alva (1998), for example, use data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)
from 22 developing countries to examine the relationship between maternal education and three
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measures of child health: infant mortality, height-for-age, and immunization status. They find
that the effect of maternal education on child mortality and height-for-age declined substantially
after controlling for region of residence and a small set of socioeconomic characteristics, such as
father/stepfather education and access to piped water.
The main limitation of Desai and Alva (1998), and many of the earlier research on
parental education and child health in general, is that these studies are based on a correlation
between parental education and children’s health outcomes. In particular, the earlier literature
does not adequately control for the endogeneity of parental education. More educated parents
may differ systematically from less-educated parents in ways that affect child health. For
instance, the observed correlation between parental education and child health may reflect
omitted factors related to family background or parental noncognitive skills. Therefore, ignoring
the endogeneity of education may bias the effects of parental education on child health.
To address this selection problem, a small and recent number of studies have attempted to
identify the causal impact of parental education on child health. Most of this research, however,
has focused on developed countries and has reached mixed conclusions. Currie and Moretti
(2003) use college openings in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s as an instrument for maternal
education. Drawing on national birth records for years 1970 to 1999, they find that maternal
education has a large positive impact on birth weight and gestational age. Their results suggest
that an additional year of education reduces the probability of low birth weight by 10 percent.
Currie and Moretti (2003) examine several mechanisms through which maternal education may
affect child health. Their findings indicate that maternal education reduces the probability of
smoking and increases use of prenatal care.
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McCrary and Royer (2011) compare fertility and child health for women born just before
and just after school entry dates, using a regression discontinuity design. Unlike Currie and
Moretti (2003), McCrary and Royer (2011) find no effects of mother’s education on either
fertility or birth weight. M. Lindeboom, A. Llena-Nozal, and B. van der Klaauw (2009) use the
1947 school reform in the United Kingdom to examine the effect of parental education on a
broad range of children’s health outcomes. They exploit the fact that the 1947 reform raised the
minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 year as the source of exogenous variation in parental
education. Consistent with McCrary & Royer (McCrary & Royer, 2011), their results suggest
that parental education has a small effect on child health.
One possible explanation for the mixed evidence of this literature is that their results may
represent different local average treatment effects. In particular, the populations of individuals
affected by the policy interventions used to extract exogenous variations in parental education
are not similar across these studies. Studies that have found a positive effect of parental
education on child health have relied on exogenous variations in education that are caused by
policy interventions at higher education levels (Currie & Moretti, 2003). These interventions
mainly target individuals at the upper end of education distribution. On the other hand, studies
that have found no impact have focused on changes in compulsory schooling laws or age-atentry policies that mainly affect low-educated individuals (M. Lindeboom et al., 2009; McCrary
& Royer, 2011). These interventions are apparently less likely to have an impact on individuals’
health behavior or attitudes and, as a result, do not affect child health.
The evidence from developing countries is still limited but growing. For instance,
Breierova and Duflo (2004) use a large-scale school construction program that was implemented
in Indonesia in the 1970s as the source of exogenous variation in parental education. They
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exploit the difference in the exposure to the program, resulting from an individual year of birth
and region of birth, as an instrument for parental education. Their findings suggest that parental
education substantially reduces infant mortality, with no significant difference between the
effects of paternal and maternal education. Chou, Liu, Grossman, and Joyce (2010) used the
1968 expansion of compulsory schooling in Taiwan from 6 to 9 years to create an exogenous
variation in parental education. Using birth and death records for the years 1978-1999, Chou et
al. found that parental education reduces the probability of both low birth weight and child
mortality.
Grépin and Bharadwaj (2015) exploit the 1980 expansion of secondary education in
Zimbabwe to extract an exogenous variation in maternal education. They examine health
outcomes of children born to three groups of mothers: mother fully exposed to the policy reform,
mothers partially exposed, and mothers in the control group. Their results suggest that children
born to mothers most likely benefited from the reform were about 21 percent less likely to die
than children born to slightly older mothers. They also find that maternal education improves
women economic opportunity and increases the age at childbearing.
This chapter contributes to the growing literature of developing countries by examining
the causal impact of parents’ education on children’s health outcomes in one of the Middle
Eastern and North African countries, Egypt. Most of the existing literature on developing
countries has focused on interventions targeting individuals with relatively high levels of
education. The findings of this literature show that parental education improves children health
outcomes. This chapter contributes to the growing literature by shedding light on interventions
targeting individuals with relatively low levels of education and exploring whether they produce
similar effects on children health outcomes.
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3. Data

The data for this study come from the Birth Recode module of the Egyptian Demographic
and Health Survey (EDHS). I use data from the six recent waves: 1995, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008,
and 2014. The total sample includes 51,776 living children who were under age five at the time
of the survey and 24,535 children who died before their fifth birthdays. Thus, the total sample
includes 76,311 children born to 47,463 mothers and fathers19.
The key variables in the analysis of this chapter are parental education and child health
outcomes. I measure maternal education and paternal education, separately, as completed years
of schooling attained in adulthood. The DHS survey provides information on educational levels
and the grades attended at each level, which are used to compute years of schooling as explained
in chapter I. I examine the effects of parental education on two outcomes: child mortality and
child nutritional status. Measures of child mortality are calculated from retrospective information
that was collected by the EDHS survey about children who have died. Information is collected
about sex, month and year of birth, and age at death. I use this information to create three
different measures of mortality: neonatal, infant, and under-five mortality. Neonatal mortality is
defined as the probability of dying within the first month of life. Infant mortality is defined as the
probability of dying during the first year of life. Whereas, under-five mortality is defined as the
probability of dying before the fifth birthday.
Child nutritional status is measured using child height-for-age and weight-for-height. The
EDHS data provides information on height-for-age and weight-for-height for all living children
under age five. Measurements of height and weight were administered and collected by EDHS

Since the analysis in this essay focuses on the effects of mothers’ and fathers’ education, I exclude single-parent
households. They represent about three percent of the total sample.
19
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interviewers at the time of the survey. The collected measures were then standardized by the
EDHS team using data from the World Health Organization. Using these standardized measures,
I create three binary variables that indicate whether a child was stunted, thin, or overweight at the
time of the survey.
Children whose height-for-age measures are below minus two standard deviations from
the median of the reference population are considered short for their age, i.e., stunted. Children
whose weight-for-height measures are below minus two standard deviations from the median of
the reference population are too thin for their height, i.e., wasted. Adverse health consequences
are also associated with overweight among young children. Therefore, I create a binary variable
for children whose weight-for-height is more than two standard deviations above the median of
the reference population.
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics for parents and children in the sample. The total
sample is composed of 47,463 mothers and fathers. As can be seen, the average years of
education for mothers in the sample is 4.6 years. Fathers are more educated than mothers. In
particular, the average father in the sample has six years of education. Also, fathers in the sample
are about eight years older than mothers (39.7 years versus 32). Almost all the fathers in the
sample (98 percent) had jobs at the time of the survey; whereas, only 13 percent of the mothers
were participating in the labor market. The majority of households in the sample (68 percent)
live in rural areas, and slightly more than half (52 percent) of the families are in the lowest two
wealth quintiles.
Table 8 also provides descriptive statistics for living children under age five and children
who died before their fifth birthdays. The 47,463 parents in the sample have a total of 51,776
living children and 24,535 dead children. As can be seen from the table, the average living child
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is about two years old at the time of the survey. The sample is equally distributed between male
and female children. Twenty-three percent of the living children in the sample are considered
stunted, that is, they are too short for their ages. Additionally, there is six percent of children
whose weights are considered too small for their heights (thin); whereas eleven percent of
children have weights that are considered too large for their heights (overweight). The bottom
part of Table 8 describes the characteristics of children who died before their fifth birthdays. Of
these children, 83 percent had died before their first birthdays (infant mortality) while 43 percent
had died before their first month (neonatal mortality).
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
Characteristics
Characteristics of mothers
Mother education
Mother age
Mother age at first birth
Mother work=1
Number of mothers
Characteristics of fathers
Father education
Father age
Father work=1
Number of fathers
Characteristics of households
Urban=1
First wealth quintile=1
Second wealth quintile=1
Third wealth quintile =1
Fourth wealth quintile=1
Fifth wealth quintile =1
Characteristics of living children under five
child male=1
child age
child is stunted=1
child is thin=1
child is overweight=1
Number of living children under five
Characteristics of dead children under five
Child male=1
Neonatal mortality
Infant mortality
Under-five mortality
Number of dead children under five

Mean

Standard Deviation

4.62
32.03
20.08
0.13
47,463

5.18
8.10
3.87
0.33
-

6.00
39.70
0.98
47,463

5.06
10.26
0.13
-

0.32
0.29
0.23
0.20
0.17
0.11

0.47
0.46
0.42
0.40
0.37
0.31

0.51
1.99
0.23
0.06
0.11
51,776

0.50
1.40
0.42
0.23
0.31
-

0.51
0.43
0.83
0.100
24,535

-

This table is calculated using the Birth Recodes questionnaire of the EDHS survey, six waves (1995-2014).
Mortality measures in the last panel are calculated as a ratio of total children died under five (24,535 children).
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Table 9 and Table 10 below show the means of children’s health outcomes by mothers’
and fathers’ education, respectively. The conclusions of these tables are quite similar. Altogether,
the percentage of stunted children is smaller among highly educated parents. Highly educated
parents, however, appear to have higher percentages of overweight children compared to less
educated parents. The percentages of wasted (thin) children do not seem to follow a particular
pattern with any of the parents’ education. Tables 9 and Table 10 also show the means of the
mortality outcomes. The data show that more educated parents are less likely to have children die
before their fifth birthdays (under-five mortality). The same is also true regarding infant
mortality and neonatal mortality.

Table 9: Means of Children Health Outcomes by Years of Mothers’ Education
Children Health
Outcomes
Malnutrition outcomes
child is stunted=1
child is thin=1
child is
overweight=1
Mortality outcomes
Under-five mortality
Infant mortality
Neonatal mortality

No
formal
edu.

Edu. years
1-6

Edu. years
7-9

Edu. years
10-12

Edu.
years
>12

All

0.26
0.05

0.24
0.05

0.22
0.06

0.19
0.06

0.19
0.05

0.23
0.06

0.09

0.10

0.11

0.12

0.12

0.45
0.40
0.25

0.40
0.36
0.22

0.17
0.16
0.10

0.10
0.09
0.06

0.08
0.07
0.05

This table is computed using the six waves of the EDHS (1995-2014).
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0.11

0.32
0.28
0.17

Table 10: Means of Children Health Outcomes by Years of Mothers’ Education
Children Health
Outcomes

No formal
edu.

Edu. years
1-6

Edu. years
7-9

Edu. years
10-12

Edu. years
>12

Overall

Malnutrition outcomes
child is stunted=1
child is thin=1
child is overweight=1

0.27
0.06
0.09

0.24
0.05
0.10

0.21
0.06
0.12

0.21
0.06
0.12

0.19
0.05
0.11

0.23
0.06
0.11

Mortality outcomes
Under-five mortality
Infant mortality
Neonatal mortality

0.49
0.44
0.28

0.38
0.33
0.20

0.23
0.21
0.12

0.15
0.13
0.08

0.16
0.15
0.10

0.32
0.28
0.17

This table is computed using the six waves of the EDHS (1995-2014).

4. Methodology

A common approach to examine the effect of parental education on child health is to use
a standard regression analysis. The regression equation is identified as follows:
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗

(1)

where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is a measure of child health for child 𝑖 of parent 𝑗, such as child mortality or nutritional
status; 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 is a measure of mother’s/father’s years of schooling; and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is an
idiosyncratic error term. If parental education is uncorrelated with the error term, then 𝛽
represents the true causal effect of parental education on the health outcomes of their children.
However, parents with different levels of education tend to be systematically different in their
abilities, motivations, and backgrounds. Therefore, the estimate of 𝛽 is expected to be biased.
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One way to minimize this bias is to control for observable characteristics of both parents
and their children, as follows:
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + δ 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑋𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 (2)
where 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of child characteristics such as age and gender and 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of parents’
characteristics such as region and income. For this approach to produce unbiased estimates, it
requires that all factors that contaminate the relationship between parental education and child
health should be controlled for. In most cases, only a small set of parents’ characteristics can be
observed. Other important characteristics such as parents’ genetic cognitive ability, which is
expected to have substantial impacts on both parental education and child health, are inherently
difficult to measure and, therefore, are missing from the regression equation. Failure to control
for unobservable factors would result in a biased estimate of 𝛽.
An alternative approach is to use a natural experiment that creates an exogenous variation
in parental education, independent of the characteristics of parents. I follow this approach in this
chapter, using the identification strategy of the first chapter. In particular, I use the change in the
length of primary schooling in Egypt, introduced in the late 1980s, to extract an exogenous
variation in parental education. As explained in Chapter I, in 1988, the Egyptian government
reduced the length of primary schooling from six to five years, moving from a system of 12 years
to a total of 11 years toward completing a high school degree. The first school cohort who was
affected by the Egyptian reform comprises individuals who were born between October 1977
and September 1978. Therefore, October 1977 represents a cutoff date. Individuals born before
that date had to attend one more year in primary school compared to individuals born on or after
that date.
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I use a nonparametric regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the effect of
parental education on child health. In particular, I compare parental education around the cutoff
date and relate the difference in their children’s health outcomes to the difference in their
educational attainment. I estimate two separates RD equations for mothers and fathers. A
standard linear RD model for a parent (mothers and fathers separately) is specified as follow:
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 𝐷𝑗 + 𝛾3 (𝑋𝑗 − 𝑐) + 𝛾4 𝐷𝑗 ∗ (𝑋𝑗 − 𝑐) + 𝛾5 𝑍 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗

(3)

where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the outcome of interest (child mortality and child nutritional measures) for child 𝑖 of
parent 𝑗; 𝐷𝑗 is an indicator variable equal one if parent 𝑗 was born on or after October 1977; 𝑋𝑗 is
the forcing variable, which is parent 𝑗’s birthdate; whereas, 𝑐 is the cutoff date; (𝑋𝑗 − 𝑐)
represents the deviation in months of parent 𝑗’s birthdate from the cutoff date; 𝑍 is a vector of
control variables that includes child’s age (or child year of birth for mortality outcomes), child
gender, a binary variable for urban status, a set of binary variables for region of residence (upper
rural, upper urban, lower rural, lower urban, urban governorates, and frontier governorates), and
survey-fixed effects. I also estimate a polynomial (quadratic) model to account for any
nonlinearity in the relationship between the forcing variable and child health. The quadratic
regression is specified as follows.
2

2

𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛿1 + 𝛿2 𝐷𝑗 + 𝛿3 (𝑋𝑗 − 𝑐) + 𝛿4 𝐷𝑗 ∗ (𝑋𝑗 − 𝑐) + 𝛿5 (𝑋𝑗 − 𝑐) + 𝛿6 𝐷𝑗 ∗ (𝑋𝑗 − 𝑐) + 𝛿5 𝑍
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗.

(4)

I estimate Eq.3 and Eq.4 using kernel-based local regressions within a 60-month
(𝑥−𝑐)

bandwidth. The weighting function I use is based on the triangle kernel K(.) = max {0, 1 − |

ℎ

|} similar to McCrary & Royer (2011), where ℎ is the bandwidth. I also test the sensitivity of
results to the chosen bandwidth in the robustness checks section of this chapter
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5. Results
5.1. Graphical Representation
As the first step in my analysis, I examine the discontinuities in parents’ education and
children health outcomes graphically. Figures 6 through 9 show the results of this analysis. The
first two figures show the discontinuities in mother education and child health outcomes; while
the last two figures show the discontinuities in fathers’ education and child health outcomes. For
mother’s sample and father’s sample, child nutritional status and child mortality are analyzed
separately. In all the figures, the horizontal axes measure the standardized forcing variable,
which is the deviations of parental dates of birth from October 1977.
These figures show noticeable discontinuities in both mother’s and father’s education. As
can be seen, parents who attended less time in primary schooling ended up with lower
educational attainments in adulthood. The discontinuity in father’s education appears to be larger
than the discontinuity in mother’s education. The comparison of children health outcomes
around the cutoff for both mothers’ and fathers’ samples show, however, small discontinuities
for all children’s health outcomes.
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Figure 6: Discontinuity in Mother Education and Child Malnutrition

Figure 7: Discontinuity in Mother Education and Child Mortality
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Figure 8: Discontinuity in Father Education and Child Malnutrition

Figure 9: Discontinuity in Father Education and Child Mortality
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5.2. Main Results
This section presents the main results. I estimate separate models for mothers and fathers.
In the robustness checks section, I include both mother’s and father’s education in the same
regression to explore the interaction between the two variables. Table 11 shows the effects on
child nutritional status. The sample in these models includes living children aged 0-4 at the time
of the survey (51,776 children). I use three measures of nutritional status: a binary variable that
indicates whether a child was stunted at the time of the survey, a binary variable for whether a
child was underweight (thin or wasted) and a binary variable for whether a child was overweight.
I report results from both linear and polynomial kernel regressions.
As shown in the first row, the exogenous variation in mother education is -0.816, which
is significant at the 99 percent confidence level. This indicates that mothers who attended the
five-year primary school system completed, on average, 0.82 fewer years of education in
adulthood than mothers who attended the six-year system. Using a local Polynomial regression
slightly reduces the estimate of discontinuity in mother’s education from 0.816 to 0.764. Both
the local linear and polynomial models produce very similar results with slight changes in
magnitudes. I focus the discussion on the findings from the local polynomial models as the
preferred set of estimates to account for the possibility of nonlinearities in the relationship
between the forcing variable and the outcomes. By looking at the effects of mother’s education
on child malnutrition in panels a, b, and c, mother’s education seems to improve child health. For
example, each year of maternal education reduces the probability of stunting and overweight by
1.6 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively. Surprisingly, the probability of underweight
increases by 0.1 percentage points with each additional year of mother’s education. None of
these effects are, however, statistically significant at the conventional confidence levels.
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Columns 3-4 of Table 11 also show the effects of father’s education on the same set of
children’s health outcomes. As can be seen from the last column, the exogenous variation in
father’s education is statistically significant with a magnitude that is higher than mother’s
education. In particular, fathers who attended the five-year primary system ended up completing
0.91 fewer years of education in adulthood compared to fathers who attended the six-year
system. Similar to mothers’ results, father’s education has a positive impact on child nutritional
status. Each year of a father’s education reduces the probability of stunting and underweight by
2.5 and 2.1 percentage points, respectively. These effects are not, however, distinguishable from
zero.

Table 11: The Effects of Parent Education (Separately) on Child Malnutrition: RD Models
Mothers’ Sample
Fathers’ Sample
Variables
Local
Local
Local
Local
Linear
Polynomial
Linear
Polynomial
Exogenous variation in education
Effects of education on:
(a) Stunting
(b) Underweight
(c) Overweight
Local sample
Total sample

-0.816***
(0.183)

-0.764***
(0.266)

-0.979***
(0.185)

-0.912***
(0.190)

-0.003
(0.015)
0.001
(0.009)
0.004
(0.012)
21,947
51,776

-0.016
(0.024)
0.001
(0.014)
-0.009
(0.019)
21,947
51,776

-0.022
(0.016)
0.012
(0.009)
-0.017
(0.012)
16,823
51,776

-0.025
(0.017)
0.014
(0.011)
-0.021
(0.014)
16,823
51,776

In all regressions, I use a 60-month bandwidth and a triangle kernel weighting function. I also control for child’s
age, child gender, a binary variable for urban, a set of binary variables for region of residence (upper rural, upper
urban, lower rural, lower urban, urban governorates, and frontier governorates), and survey-fixed effects. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99 confidence level. ** refers to the 95 confidence level, and *
refers to the 90 confidence level.
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Table 12 presents the results for the child mortality outcomes. I use three binary measures
of child mortality: under-five mortality, infant mortality, and neonatal mortality. Under-five
mortality is coded as 1 for children who died before their fifth birthday; infant mortality is coded
as 1 for children who died before their first birthday; and neonatal mortality is coded as 1 for
children who died in their first month. The reference group in all the three measures comprises
children who were alive at the time of the survey. The effects of mother’s education are shown in
the first two columns while the effects of father’s education are shown in the last two columns.
As can be seen, the exogenous variation in mother’s education amounts to about 0.8 years;
whereas, the exogenous variation in father’s education is about one year of schooling. These
estimates are very close to the estimates in Table 11 above.
Focusing the discussion on the results of the local polynomial regressions, the results
show that mother’s education seems to reduce child mortality. In particular, each year of
mother’s education reduces the probability that a child dies before her fifth birthday by 0.1
percentage points. The effect is even larger for infant mortality (about 0.7 percentage points).
Similar to the results in Table 11, these effects are not distinguishable from zero. Estimates from
the fathers’ sample also show that the increase in father’s education reduces child mortality rates.
Unlike mother’s education, the effect of father’s education is larger for neonatal mortality. In
particular, each additional year of father’s education reduces the probability that a child dies
before her first month by 0.7 percentage points. Father’s education also reduces the probability
of under-five mortality and infant mortality by 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively.
Similar to mother’s education, the effects of father’s education on child mortality are not
statistically significant at the conventional confidence levels20.

I also found similar insignificant results for both mother’s education and father’s education using local Probit
regressions.
20
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Table 12: The Effects of Parent Education (Separately) on Child Mortality: RD Models
Mothers’ Sample
Fathers’ Sample
Effects of education on:
Local
Local
Local
Local
Linear Polynomial
Linear
Polynomial
(a) Under-five mortality
Exogenous variation in education -0.810*** -0.784*** -1.047***
-0.973***
(0.179)
(0.262)
(0.187)
(0.192)
Estimated effect (2nd stage)
0.001
-0.001
-0.003
-0.004
(0.009)
(0.013)
(0.008)
(0.009)
Local sample
24,925
24,925
18,520
18,520
Total sample
76,311
76,311
76,311
76,311
(b) Infant mortality
Exogenous variation in education -0.829*** -0.808*** -1.052***
-0.980***
(0.180)
(0.263)
(0.187)
(0.192)
Estimated effect (2nd stage)
0.000
-0.007
-0.003
-0.003
(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.008)
(0.008)
Local sample
24,620
24,620
18,367
18,367
Total sample
72,129
72,129
72,129
72,129
(c) Neonatal mortality
Exogenous variation in education -0.868*** -0.849*** -1.052***
-0.987***
(0.182)
(0.268)
(0.187)
(0.192)
Estimated effect (2nd stage)
0.005
-0.000
-0.006
-0.007
(0.007)
(0.010)
(0.006)
(0.007)
Local sample
23,602
23,602
17,768
17,768
Total sample
62,231
62,231
62,231
62,231
In all regressions, I use a 60-month bandwidth and a triangle kernel weighting function. I also control for child’s
year of birth fixed effects, child gender, a binary variable for urban, a set of binary variables for region of residence
(upper rural, upper urban, lower rural, lower urban, urban governorates, and frontier governorates), and survey-fixed
effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99 confidence level. ** refers to the 95
confidence level, and * refers to the 90 confidence level.

6. Robustness Checks

In this section, I present multiple robustness checks to the main results in Tables 11 and
12. First, I examine the sensitivity of the main results to the chosen bandwidth. Second, I explore
the contribution of mother’s and father’s education by including both variables in the same
regression. Finally, I restrict the sample to parents who actually attended one of the primary
school systems and explore the effects of parents’ education on child health among these parents.
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6.1. Sensitivity to Bandwidths

The main results of this chapter show that parental education has no significant impacts
on child health. To examine to what extent these findings are sensitive to the chosen 60-month
bandwidth, I re-estimate the models using a broad range of bandwidths. The estimates from these
models are shown in Figures 10-13, with 90-percent confidence intervals. Figures 10 and 11
provide the estimated effects of mother’s education on child nutritional status and child
mortality; whereas, Figure 12 and Figure 13 present the effects of father’s education on the same
set of outcomes. Altogether, these graphs show that the effects of parental education are not
statistically significant regardless of the bandwidths used in the analysis. Increasing the
bandwidth slightly changes the magnitude of the estimated effects, but all the effects remain
statistically insignificant.
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Figure 10: 90% CI for the Estimated Effect of Mother’s Education on Child Malnutrition

Figure 11: 90% CI for the Estimated Effect of Mother’s Education on Child Mortality
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Figure 12: 90% CI for the Estimated Effect of Father’s Education on Child Malnutrition

Figure 13: 90% CI for the Estimated Effect of Father’s Education on Child Mortality
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6.2. Interaction between Mother and Father Education
In the main analysis, I estimate the effects of mother’s education and father’s education,
separately, without controlling for spouse education in each model. This is done in order not to
block one of the mechanisms through which each parent’ education may affect child health. To
illustrate, the association between partners’ education is well documented in the literature.
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) show that under positive assortative mating, high-educated
women are more likely to marry high-educated men. Thus, part of the effect of each parent’s
education on children’s outcomes is augmented through the education of the other partner.
I explore further the contribution of mother’s education and father’s education,
separately, I estimate one regression model where I include both mother’s education and father’s
education. I use the types of primary schooling systems attended by each of them to instrument
their education. The results of the local Polynomial regressions for child malnutrition outcomes
are shown in Table 13, whereas, the results of the local Polynomial regressions for child
mortality outcomes are presented in Table 14 below. The local linear estimates are provided in
Tables 30 and 31 in Appendix B. The first column of each table reproduces the results from
Tables 11 and 12, respectively. As can be seen, the magnitudes of the effects of mother’s
education and father’s education have quite changed, but all estimates remain statistically
insignificant.
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Variables

Table 13: The Effects of Parent’s Education on Child Malnutrition
Local Polynomial (separate Local Polynomial
regressions, Table 11)
(combined
regressions)

Exogenous variation in mother’s education
Exogenous variation in father’s education
(a) Probability of Stunting
Effect of mother’s education
Effect of father’s education
(b) Probability of Underweight
Effect of mother’s education
Effect of father’s education
(c) Probability of Overweight
Effect of mother’s education
Effect of father’s education

Local sample
Total Sample

-0.764***
(0.266)
-0.912***
(0.190)

-0.807***
(0.271)
-1.268***
(0.213)

-0.016
(0.024)
-0.025
(0.017)

-0.032
(0.043)
0.024
(0.036)

0.001
(0.014)
0.014
(0.011)

-0.009
(0.025)
0.015
(0.021)

-0.009
(0.019)
-0.021
(0.014)

-0.020
(0.033)
0.008
(0.028)

21,947
51,776

21,947
51,776

The first column re-produces the outputs of Table 11 above (separate regressions). The second column combines
both mother’s education and father’s education in one regression. In all regressions, I use a 60-month bandwidth and
a triangle weighting function. I also control for child’s age, child gender, a binary variable for urban, a set of binary
variables for region of residence (upper rural, upper urban, lower rural, lower urban, urban governorates, and
frontier governorates), and survey-fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99
confidence level. ** refers to the 95 confidence level, and * refers to the 90 confidence level.
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Table 14: The Effects of Parent Education on Child Mortality
Variables
(a) Under-five-year mortality
Exogenous variation in mother’s education
Exogenous variation in father’s education
Effect of mother’s education
Effect of father’s education
Local sample
Total Sample
(b) Under-one-year mortality
Exogenous variation in mother education
Exogenous variation in father education
Effect of mother’s education
Effect of father’s education
Local Sample
Total Sample
(c) Under-one-month mortality
Exogenous variation in mother education
Exogenous variation in father education
Effect of mother’s education
Effect of father’s education
Local sample
Total Sample

Local Polynomial
(separate regressions,
Table 12)

Local
Polynomial
(combined
regressions)

-0.784***
(0.262)
-0.973***
(0.192)
-0.001
(0.013)
-0.004
(0.009)
26,916
76,311

-0.877***
(0.259)
-1.238***
(0.207)
0.004
(0.020)
-0.011
(0.017)
26,916
76,311

-0.808***
(0.263)
-0.980***
(0.192)
-0.007
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.008)
26,611
72,129

-0.903***
(0.260)
-1.239***
(0.207)
-0.004
(0.019)
-0.005
(0.016)
26,611
72,129

-0.849***
(0.268)
-0.987***
(0.192)
-0.000
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.007)
25,593
62,231

-0.963***
(0.264)
-1.230***
(0.207)
0.005
(0.015)
-0.009
(0.014)
25,593
62,231

The first column re-produces the outputs of Table 12 above (separate regressions). The second column combines
both mother’s education and father’s education in one regression. In all regressions, I use a 60-month bandwidth and
a triangle weighting function. I also control for child’s year of birth, child gender, a binary variable for urban, a set
of binary variables for region of residence (upper rural, upper urban, lower rural, lower urban, urban governorates,
and frontier governorates), and survey-fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99
confidence level. ** refers to the 95 confidence level, and * refers to the 90 confidence level.
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6.3. Restricting the Sample to Parents with at Least a Primary School Degree

The analysis of this chapter assigns parents to one of the primary schooling systems
based on their dates of births. In particular, parents born before October 1977 are considered
among the six-year primary cohort, whereas, parents born on or after October 1977 are
considered among the five-year primary cohort. However, about 47 percent of the mothers in the
sample has no formal education, and another 10 percent did not complete their primary
education. Likewise, 32 percent of the fathers has no formal education whereas 10 percent did
not complete their primary education. These parents neither attended the six-year primary system
nor did they attend the five-year system. They are however classified into one of these systems
based on their dates of births.
The idea behind including these parents in the analysis is that the decisions of individuals
not to go to school or drop out of the primary school might be influenced by the type of primary
schooling system. For example, households who decided to drop their children out of the primary
school after the fourth grade under the six-year primary system might had chosen differently if
they knew that their children would only need to stay one more year toward completing a
primary school degree. Having said that, the length of primary schooling, however, might hardly
explain household decisions not to enroll their children in school.
Given the considerable portion of parents with no formal education in the sample, there
are some concerns about the extent to which they might drive the main results of section 5. In
particular, a considerable portion of these parents was born before 1977, and hence, they are
classified among the six-year primary cohort21. Therefore, including these parents in the analysis

21

Within the chosen 60-month bandwidth, 57 percent of these mothers are classified among the six-year primary cohort
whereas, 66 percent of these fathers are classified among the six-year primary cohort.
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underestimates the exogenous variation in education22 which might explain the insignificant
results of section 5. To explore this issue further, I focus the analysis in this section on parents
who completed, at least, a primary school degree. These are the parents who actually faced either
the six-year primary system or the five-year primary system. The results of this analysis are
shown in Tables 15 and 16 for children malnutrition outcomes and children mortality outcomes,
respectively. As can be seen from these tables, the exogenous variations in parents’ education are
larger than before, but all the effects of mother’s education and father’s education remain
statistically insignificant.

Table 15: The Effects of Parent’s Education on Child Malnutrition: Restricted Sample
Mothers’ Sample
Fathers’ Sample
Variables
Local
Local
Local
Local
Linear
Polynomial
Linear
Polynomial
Exogenous variation in
education
Effects of education on:
(a) Stunting
(b) Underweight
(c) Overweight

Observations (local sample)

-1.444***

-1.737***

-1.454***

-1.430***

(0.127)

(0.186)

(0.121)

(0.122)

0.009
(0.011)
0.006
(0.006)
0.005
(0.009)

0.002
(0.014)
0.005
(0.008)
-0.009
(0.012)

-0.015
(0.012)
0.009
(0.007)
-0.009
(0.009)

-0.017
(0.012)
0.010
(0.008)
-0.011
(0.010)

12,227

12,227

11,636

11,636

The restricted sample consists of parents who have at least a primary degree (Primary degree and higher). In all
these regressions, I control for child’s age, child gender, a binary variable for urban, set of binary variables for
region of residence (upper rural, upper urban, lower rural, lower urban, urban governorates, and frontier
governorates), and survey-fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99 confidence
level. ** refers to the 95 confidence level, and * refers to the 90 confidence level.

22

This is because the majority of these parents are classified among the six-year primary cohort along with the fact
that their educational attainment is almost zero or close to zero. This might create a downward bias of the true effect
of one additional year in primary schooling.
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Table 16: The Effects of Parent’s Education on Child Mortality: Restricted Sample
Mothers’ Sample
Fathers’ Sample
Effects of education on:
Local
Local
Local
Local
Linear
Polynomial
Linear
Polynomial
(a) Under-five-year mortality
Exogenous variation in education
-1.448***
-1.743*** -1.497*** -1.485***
(0.127)
(0.189)
(0.120)
(0.121)
nd
Estimated effect (2 stage)
0.003
0.004
0.002
0.001
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.006)
(0.006)
Local sample
13,393
13,393
12,571
12,571
(b) Under-one-year mortality
Exogenous variation in education
Estimated effect (2nd stage)
Local sample
(c) Under-one-month mortality
Exogenous variation in education
Estimated effect (2nd stage)
Local sample

-1.450***
(0.127)
0.003
(0.006)
13,281

-1.753***
(0.189)
0.001
(0.008)
13,281

-1.492***
(0.120)
0.003
(0.006)
12,489

-1.481***
(0.121)
0.002
(0.006)
12,489

-1.456***
(0.127)
0.008
(0.005)
12,958

-1.766***
(0.188)
0.005
(0.007)
12,958

-1.483***
(0.120)
-0.001
(0.005)
12,189

-1.469***
(0.121)
-0.001
(0.005)
12,189

The restricted sample consists of parents who have at least a primary degree. In all these regressions, I control for
child’s year of birth, child gender, a binary variable for urban, set of binary variables for region of residence (upper
rural, upper urban, lower rural, lower urban, urban governorates, and frontier governorates), and survey-fixed
effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99 confidence level. ** refers to the 95
confidence level, and * refers to the 90 confidence level.

7. Explaining the Insignificant Effects of Parental Education
The main results of this chapter suggest that the effect of parental education on child
health is not distinguishable from zero. In this section, I provide a possible explanation for the
insignificant effects of parental education. Specifically, I argue that the lack of effects on child
health can be explained by two factors that are closely related: the low levels of parental
education in Egypt and the poor quality of schooling, particularly at the primary school level. In
particular, the average years of schooling for mothers in the sample is 4.6 years and 6.0 years for
fathers. Education at this low level is not expected to produce significant effects on child health,
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especially given the fact that not only parents in the sample are low educated, but also the quality
of education they receive is poor23. Among this group of low-educated individuals, education is
expected to have little effect on intermediate outcomes that are expected to improve child health
such as health knowledge and practices.
To test this explanation, I examine the effect of education on three key intermediate
outcomes (channels) through which parental education is thought to improve child health
(Glewwe, 1999). More specifically, I examine the effect of parental education on three
mechanisms: literacy skills, access to information, and health behavior. I measure literacy skills
using a binary variable that is coded 1 for mothers who can read easily and zero otherwise.
Parental access to information is measured using a binary variable that takes 1 if a mother reads a
newspaper at least once a week and zero otherwise. Health behavior is measured using two
measures that capture health practices during pregnancy: the probability of visiting a doctor and
the number of doctor visits. It is worth noting that these outcomes are only available for mothers
in the sample, and therefore, I cannot generalize the results to fathers.
Figure 14 shows no discontinuity in any of these three intermediate outcomes. That is,
mothers around the cutoff are very similar in literacy skills, access to information, and the
likelihood and the number of doctor visits during pregnancy. The conclusion from the graphical
analysis is supported by the regression estimates in Table 17. As can be seen from the table,
education has no significant impacts on literacy skills and other intermediate outcomes24.

23

According to estimates from the UNESCO (2015), Egypt is one of ten countries that account for three quarters of
the world illiterate adults. Further, a recent report by the World Economic Forum ranked Egypt last in the quality of
primary education worldwide (2013).
24
The findings of this chapter are quite consistent with the findings of the first chapter. In particular, in the first
chapter I found that the increase in female education, resulting from the change in the length of primary schooling,
did not change women’s fertility preferences, enhance women’s job opportunities or increase their usages of
contraceptive methods.
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Figure 14: Discontinuity in Parents’ Intermediate Outcomes

Table 17: The Effects of Mother’s Education on Intermediate Outcomes
Mothers’ Sample
Variables
Local Linear Local Polynomial
Exogenous variation in education
-0.783***
-0.731***
(0.185)
(0.271)
Effects of education on:
(a) Mother can read easily
(b) Mother read newspaper
(c) Number of doctor visits
(d) Probability of visiting a doctor
Local sample

0.009
(0.013)
0.014
(0.010)
0.284
(0.224)
0.017
(0.020)
22,570

0.010
(0.017)
0.021
(0.013)
0.405
(0.348)
0.022
(0.031)
22,570

This table is estimated using the DHS date (six waves).
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8. Conclusion
This chapter examines the causal impact of parental education on child mortality and
nutritional status. I exploit the reduction in the length of primary schooling in Egypt in 1988
from six to five years to create exogenous variations in parental education. The results suggest
that individuals who spent six years in primary school have completed, on average, one more
year of schooling compared to individuals who spent five years. Using this exogenous variation,
I find that parental education has no significant effects on children’s health outcomes. These
results are quite robust to several robustness checks and sample restrictions. My findings are also
consistent with some of the current evidence on the effects of parental education on child health
in developed countries (Maarten Lindeboom, Ana Llena-Nozal, & Bas van der Klaauw, 2009;
McCrary & Royer, 2011).
The results of this chapter, however, differ from the findings of the existing literature on
developing countries. This chapter argues that the difference in the findings could be explained
by the difference in the interventions used to create the exogenous variations in parental
education. In particular, the existing literature has focused on interventions that influenced
individuals with relatively higher levels of education compared to individuals influenced by the
educational policy change in Egypt in 1988. Lower educational levels are usually combined with
the poor quality of education in developing countries, and therefore, education at these levels is
expected to have small effects on health knowledge and practices. To support this argument, I
provide suggestive evidence that education at that level has little effects on parents’ intermediate
outcomes that are expected to be essential to improve child health such as literacy skills, access
to information, and health behavior.
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The findings of this chapter have important implications for policies that aim to reduce
child mortality and improve child health in developing countries. In particular, the evidence
presented in this chapter suggests that policy interventions that target education at low levels are
expected to have small effects on children’s health outcomes. Therefore, policymakers in
developing countries should not rely only on education to improve child health, especially
among low-educated parents. Instead, policymakers should either improve the quality of
education or adopt supplementary policies that focus on improving health awareness and
practices of parents. For example, health education can be augmented in compulsory education
through adjusting curricula to ensure that individuals obtain the essential health knowledge that
positively affect their health behaviors and enable them to raise healthy children in the future.
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Chapter III: In the Same Boat, but Not Equals: The Heterogeneous Effects of Parental
Income on Child Labor

1. Introduction
Despite vigorous efforts by international organizations such as the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), child labor has remained
a serious issue all over the world. The recent report by the ILO has shown that by the end of
2012 there were roughly 168 million children around the world in the child labor force (Diallo et
al., 2013). More than half of those children (115 million) work in hazardous conditions—
including working in mines, working with chemicals in agriculture or with dangerous machinery
(UNICEF, a) .
In the past three decades, a considerable number of studies have been published on the
determinants of child labor. The seminal theoretical work by Basu and Van (1998) emphasized
the role of poverty as the main reason for child labor. They explained that parents send their
children to work if and only if households cannot meet its subsistence needs without the child’s
income. The empirical literature of child labor however has found conflicting results related to
the effect of parental income on child labor. While some studies have found that poverty is the
primary reason for children’s work and that improving economic conditions of poor households
reduce child labor (Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 2006; Edmonds, 2005; Wahba, 2006), other studies
have found that high incidences of child labor are associated with high levels of income
(Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Dumas, 2007; Kambhampati & Rajan, 2006; Kruger, 2007; Ray,
2000). Additionally, Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) and Schultz (2004) found that
giving money to the poor does not have an impact on child labor.
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Both the theoretical and empirical literature on child labor provide little distinction
between the types of child work. In particular, economic theory models child labor from a labor
supply prospective where a representative household allocates child’s time across different
activities (e.g., school, work, leisure) such that the rates of return to child’s time are equal across
different activities. The economic theory implicitly assumes pecuniary returns to child’s work
represented by either child’s wage or the increase in household production, and hence there is
little reason in theoretical studies of child labor to distinguish between types of work (Edmonds,
2008). Likewise, the empirical literature has treated child labor as one homogenous group.
Almost all the empirical studies of child labor have relied on Living Standards or Labor Force
Surveys, which usually target adult members in households and lack detailed information about
work characteristics of children. Studies relying on these surveys measured child labor as a
single indicator variable equal to one if a child was economically active during the week before
the survey. Edmonds (2008) provides a comprehensive review of 34 theoretical and 90 empirical
studies and concludes that the child labor literature lacks a clear description of the nature and the
characteristics of child’s work.
Despite the treatment of child labor in the literature, data from the International Labor
Organization (ILO) reveal substantial differences among working children regarding the type of
employer, work intensity, hazard exposure, and work pattern (Diallo et al., 2013). Some children
work in unfavorable work conditions such as working full-year job, working in the formal labor
market, working with a heavy workload and facing hazardous conditions. On the other hand,
other children work in relatively favorable conditions including working for their families,
working a light workload in nonhazardous jobs, and working only during school break.
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The heterogeneity among working children suggests variations in parental perceptions on
child’s work and hence, in parental reasons to send their children to work. To illustrate, some
families, despite being nonpoor, might prefer to engage their children in work if they perceive
nonpecuniary returns to child’s work. For example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) argued that
land-rich households engage their children in agriculture work because they believe their
children will be better off learning farm-specific knowledge about the land that will be
transferred to them in the future. Other non-pecuniary returns to child’s work might include
teaching children the importance of education in enhancing future outcomes, helping children
build strong personalities, gaining general life experience, and developing self-reliance and
independence.
Parents who engage their children in work for non-pecuniary returns are more likely to
ensure that their children gain these benefits under favorable working conditions. Therefore, they
are less likely to allow their children to become exhausted from work or let work deter them
from going to school. Instead, they will opt for types of child’s work that may have small
monetary returns but provide a safe and relatively non-demanding working environment for their
children. On the other hand, parents who view child’s work as an additional source of income for
the household (pecuniary return) are less likely to be cautious about their child work choices.
Their children might work in the formal labor market with heavy workload under hazardous
work conditions.
Altogether, this chapter argues that the mixed evidence in the empirical literature related
to the effect of parental income on child labor- might be explained by the failure of these studies
to account for the heterogeneity of child’s work. On the one hand, poverty might be a key reason
for children working in unfavorable conditions such as job hazards and heavy workloads. On the
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other hand, poverty may not be a key reason for child’s work in nonhazardous jobs and light
workloads. Depending on the composition of working children in the data, empirical studies
might reach different results. If the data, for instance, is comprised mainly of children working
for their family, the effect of parental income, in this case, may not be crucial since other nonpecuniary factors may drive parental decisions to engage their children in the family business.
Likewise, if the survey interviews were conducted in the summer, the majority of working
children in the data might be full-time students who work only during their school break, as
opposed to the case if the interviews were conducted in other seasons. Therefore, the results of
the previous empirical studies might not be contradictory if they estimate income effects for
different subgroups of working children. The lack of detailed information about child’s work
conditions in these studies makes it difficult to attribute any of their findings to specific groups
of working children.
This chapter takes an advantage of the Egyptian 2010 National child Labor Survey
(ENCLS), which provides rich information about the characteristics and the conditions of child
work. I divide the population of working children based on several dimensions to differentiate
between favorable versus unfavorable work conditions. I then investigate whether parental
income is a significant factor in household decision to engage their children in work for each
group of working children. Namely, I disaggregate the population of working children based on
the following five dimensions: type of employer (unpaid family work vs. market work), hazard
exposure (hazardous work vs. nonhazardous work), work intensity (light workload vs. heavy
workload), age at first job (starting work as a young kid vs. starting work as an adolescent), and
work pattern (working in full-year job vs. working only during summer break).
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The ENCLS survey is the first national survey of working children in Egypt, which
aimed to provide a description of the patterns of child employment, the conditions of such
employment, and the household and community backgrounds. The survey was administered to a
nationally representative sample of 30,143 households containing 66,122 children 5 to 17 years
of age, representing 17.1 million children in Egypt. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
study to exploit the availability of such detailed data about child labor in Egypt. The results of
this chapter show that as income increases, other factors held constant, parents are less likely to
send their children to work. Most of the reduction in child’s work however comes from the
reduction in types of child labor most harmful to children. In particular, the reduction in the
likelihood of employment is higher for market work versus family work, for child labor versus
light economic activity, for hazardous work versus nonhazardous work, and for full-year work
versus working only during school break. Using an instrumental variable approach to account for
the potential endogeneity of household income, the results show that hazard exposure and work
intensity are the most significant criteria where parental income has different effects.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the
impact of income on child labor. Section 3 describes the legal framework of the child labor in
Egypt. Section 4 summarizes the data used in this study. Section 5 explains the methodology.
Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.

2. Literature Review
Over the past two decades, a considerable number of studies have been published on the
determinants of child labor. Comprehensive reviews of this literature can be found in Basu
(1999), U.S. Department of Labor (2000), Basu and Tzannatos (2003), Edmonds and Pavcnik
(2005), Edmonds (2007), and Fors (2012).
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The seminal theoretical work by Basu and Van (1998) suggests that parents send their
children to work if and only if income brought by adults in the household is insufficient to the
meet household subsistence needs. Once the adult income rises sufficiently to cover household
needs, parents will withdraw their children from the labor market because parents consider their
children's non-work a luxury good (the luxury axiom). Along similar lines, Baland and Robinson
(2000) emphasize the role of liquidity constraints in creating child labor. They show that
inefficient child labor could arise despite parental altruism because of the inability of poor
parents to borrow against the future income of their children. Similarly, Ranjan (2001) shows
that credit constraints lead to inefficiently high levels of child labor.
Despite the unambiguous theoretical prediction about the effect of household income on
child labor, empirical studies have found quite conflicting results. Some studies have found that
income reduces child labor. Edmonds (2005), for example, examined the relationship between
improvements in economic status and child labor using data from the Vietnam Living Standards
Survey. He measured child labor as an indicator variable that is equal to one if a child is engaged
in any work in the previous week and zero otherwise. His results suggest that improvements in
per capita expenditure explain 80 percent of the decline in child labor in Vietnam between 1993
and 1997. Wahba (2006) used data from the Egypt 1988 Labor Force Survey to examine the
effect of adult market wages on child labor. She found that higher adult wages reduces the
probability of child labor in market work. Beegle et al. (2006) studied the relationship between
household income shocks and child labor. They used data from the Tanzania household panel
survey and defined child labor as the total hours spent on work in the previous week. Their
findings indicate that transitory income shocks are negatively correlated with child labor. In
particular, they show that a household crop loss leads to a significant increase in child labor.

83

Several studies have questioned the explanatory power of income as the primary
determinant of child labor. Ray (2000), for example, used data from two household surveys from
Peru and Pakistan to test the poverty hypothesis. The author used a single indicator variable to
define child labor and a binary variable to define poverty threshold. Ray (2000) found evidence
of the poverty hypothesis in Pakistan, but failed to find such evidence in Peru. Seid and Gurmu
(2015) have also fail to find evidence supporting the poverty hypothesis using data from an
Ethiopia longitudinal household survey and defining child labor with a single indicator variable.
One important critique of the poverty hypothesis comes from Bhalotra and Heady (2003).
They used data from the rural samples of the 1991 Ghana Living Standards Survey and the 1991
Pakistan Integrated Household Survey. They measured child labor as total hours of child work
on the family farm. They found that households with large land sizes are more likely to engage
their children in work. Given that land is the main source of wealth in rural areas, the authors
concluded that their results were inconsistent with the poverty hypothesis. Similar analysis and
conclusion were drawn by Dumas (2007) using the Burkina Faso farm household survey.
Kambhampati and Rajan (2006) examined the relationship between regional economic
growth and child labor in India and found results opposite to Edmonds (2005). In particular, they
used a rural sample from the household socioeconomic survey and measured child labor with a
single binary variable. They found that economic growth increases rather than decreases child
labor. Likewise, Kruger (2007) examined the relationship between the county-level value of
coffee production and child labor using a sample of children from the Brazilian national
household survey. He found that increases in the county-level value of coffee production were
associated with a higher incidence of child labor.
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Despite the extensive literature on child labor, the heterogeneity of working children has
received little attention. Edmonds (2008) provides a comprehensive review of 34 theoretical
papers and 90 empirical studies published in peer-reviewed academic journals. He has
documented that there is a little distinction between types of child work in both the theoretical
and the empirical literature of child labor. The theoretical literature of child labor has discussed
child labor from a labor supply perspective. According to that literature, a family maximizes its
joint utility by allocating children time across various activities such that marginal rates of
returns to child’s time are equal. The theoretical literature implicitly assumes pecuniary returns
to child work, represented by market wage or increases in household production. Thus, all types
of child’s work have been treated similarly and combined into one homogenous group.
Likewise, the empirical literature does not clearly identify which types of child work are
relevant to the analysis. Almost, all empirical studies have relied on Living Standards Survey or
Labor Force Survey, which are not designed specifically to collect information about working
children. Therefore, information about the characteristics of child’s work is limited in these
surveys. Most empirical studies represented child labor with a single indicator variable, treating
child labor as one coherent group without careful consideration of the heterogeneity of child
labor. The lack of information on the composition of working children in these studies makes it
difficult to attribute any of their findings to specific populations of working children.
To address these limitations, this chapter takes advantage of detailed data available about
working children in Egypt to explore heterogeneous effects of parental income on child labor. In
particular, this chapter disaggregates the population of working children and investigates the
effect of household income on child labor across various subpopulations of child workers.

85

3. Legal Framework of Child Labor in Egypt
The Egyptian government has undertaken several steps to reduce child labor. In
particular, the government has ratified both ILO Convention No. 138 and the ILO Convention
No. 182, concerning setting a minimum age for working children and eliminating the worst
forms of child labor, respectively. According to these laws, children younger than 15 years old
are not allowed to work. Children 15 to 17 years may work on the condition they do not perform
hazardous tasks. Additionally, the work should not be more than 6 hours per day; allows at least
a 1-hour break per day; does not involve working overtime, on holidays, more than four
consecutive hours, and between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. The Egyptian law specifies 44 hazardous
industries, where children under 18 are not allowed to work. Examples of these industries
include working with explosives, agricultural activities involving the use of pesticides, cotton
compressing, and leather tanning (United States Department of Labor, 2009).
The problem, however, is that most of the child labor in Egypt is performed in the
informal sector, which is highly unregulated and generally disregards labor laws. There is no
enforcement mechanism to protect children working in agriculture, unregistered businesses, or
domestic service, which are expected to host the majority of child workers in Egypt. The
informality of child labor makes it difficult to obtain precise information about the intensity and
the characteristics of work done by children. Additionally, the government does not publish
statistics on the enforcement of child labor laws (United States Department of Labor's Bureau of
International Labor Affairs, 2015).
In 2010, the government made efforts, in collaboration with the ILO, to collect
comprehensive data on child labor in Egypt. In particular, the government’s Central Agency for
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and the ILO conducted the National Child Labor
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Survey in 2010 (ENCLS) and publicly released the complete report in 2012. The ENCLS survey
is considered the first internationally acknowledged assessment of the child labor, which aimed
to provide an accurate picture of the nature of child labor in Egypt.

4. Data
The data in this study come from the ENCLS survey, which was carried out in April/May
2010 by the Egyptian CAPMAS with the financial and technical assistance of the ILO's
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC). The ENCLS survey
interviewed 30,143 households containing 163,628 individuals of whom 66,122 were children
between the ages of 5 and 17. The non-missing sample that I focus on in this chapter is
composed of 54,99425 children between age 6 and 17.
The ENCL survey includes three questions about child’s work in the previous week of
the survey. The first question asked children26 whether they were engaged in any work, at least,
one hour during the past week. This is the common question asked in household and labor force
surveys used by previous studies. 5,583 children in the sample answered yes to this question. The
second question asked children who answered no to the first question whether they were engaged
in any of the following activities during the past week, even for one hour: run any kind of
business, did any work for payment, worked as a domestic worker for payment, helped in unpaid
household business, did any agriculture work in household farm, did any construction work in

25

I restrict the sample to children living in households where at least one parent is present. This limits the sample to
66,075 children between the ages of 5 and 17. Since this chapter focuses on child labor and schooling decisions, I
exclude children who are too young to attend school (based on households’ answers to the question of why a child
does not go to school) because attending school, in this case, is not a choice that families can make. This restricts the
sample to 60,336 children of age 6-17. I have also dropped the observations where household monthly income is
missing or below 100 EGP. This restricts the sample to 59,916 children. After dropping missing observations for all
other variables used in the analysis, the final sample is composed of 54,994 children between.
26
About 50 percent of the working children was interviewed in the company of an adult or an older child.
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home, caught any fish for sale, fetched water or collected firewood for household use, etc.
Household chores were excluded from these examples27. The purpose of the second question was
to ensure that respondents did not misunderstand the first question. Some family members, for
instance, may not count unpaid household work as a type of child’s work. Thus, the survey used
examples of child’s work to clarify that for them. 548 children answered yes to the second
question. The third question asked children who answered no to the second question if they had a
job that he/she will definitely return to. 419 children answered yes to this question.
Altogether, 6,550 children in the sample worked at least one hour during the week prior
to the survey or they had a job to return to. Therefore, 11.92 percent of children in the sample are
economically active. This is a broad definition for child labor, similar to that used in almost all
the empirical studies of child labor. The ILO, however, defines child labor as a subgroup of
economically active children who are under age 12 and are employed for at least one hour per
week in any type of work (excluding household chores), children age 12-14 employed for 14 or
more hours per week, and children under 18 engaged in hazardous work28. The ENCLS survey
asked working children about hazardous conditions they face during work. The description of
hazardous work is determined by the ILO and is shown in Table 1-1 in the ENCLS report (ILO
& CAPMAS, 2012). Table 32 in Appendix C shows the percentage distribution of working
children in the sample by type of hazards they face at work. The most common types of hazards
in the data include exposure to dust and fumes, exposure to extreme cold or heat at work,
unavailability of bathrooms at work, exhaustion, and bending for a long time

27

The survey also asked children several questions about household chores. However, household chores seem to be
underreported in the data (0.4 percent) and hence will be excluded from the analysis of this essay.
28
The definition of child labor of the ILO is guided by the principles enshrined in the ILO's Minimum Age Convention
No. 138 and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention No. 182.
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Based on the ILO’s definition of the child labor, 5,307 children in the sample (9.56
percent) are child laborers. This indicates that 1,243 children in the sample are only
economically active (performing light work) without being child laborers. For the purpose of
comparing the results of this chapter with the previous studies, I focus the discussion in this
chapter on the broad definition of child labor of all economically active children. In particular, I
use the broad definition of child labor to investigate the heterogeneous effects of household
income for four work dimensions: type of employer, hazard exposure, age at the first job, and
work pattern. I also explore the heterogeneous effect of household income by work intensity,
where I divide the population of working children into two subgroups: children who are
economically active but not child laborers (performing light or safe work) and child laborers as
defined by the ILO. I use the word “child labor” to refer to the broad definition of child labor;
whereas, I use the word “child labor-ILO” to refer to the narrow definition of the ILO.
Table 18 provides marginal and joint distributions of all children by their school
attendance and child labor situations. As can be seen from the table, the majority of children in
the sample (about 83 percent) attend school and do not work. About 7.3 percent of children
combine school with work, while 4.6 percent of children participate in the labor market and do
not attend school. The rest of the children (about 5 percent) neither work nor do they go to
school.

Table 18: Percentage Distributions for School Attendance and Child Labor (N=54,994)
School Attendance
Child Labor
No (%)
Yes (%)
Total (%)
5.41
82.68
88.09
No
4.58
7.34
11.92
Yes
9.99
90.02
100.00
Total
This table is computed using the NCLS Survey.

89

The percentage of child labor increases with age. In particular, 24.4 percent of children
aged 15-17 are child laborers, compared to 14 percent and 4.7 percent among children aged 1214 and 6-11, respectively. Additionally, the percentage of child laborers is higher among boys,
with 17.7 percent of boys are child laborers compared to 5.8 percent female child laborers. The
incidence of child labor in Egypt is concentrated in rural areas, with 17.3 percent of rural
children are child laborers compared to 6.7 percent child labor rate in urban areas. Governorates
such as Mounofia, Fayoom, Minya, Banisuif, Behira, Souhag, and Quena, are among the
governorates with the highest incidence of child labor. Urban governorates such as Port Said,
Giza, and Cairo are among the governorates with the lowest child labor rates.
There are differences in household socioeconomic status between working and
nonworking children. Table 19 provides descriptive statistics for working and nonworking
children. As can be seen from this table, parents of nonworking children are more educated
compared to parents of working children. Additionally, parents of nonworking children had
joined the labor market later than parents of working children who were themselves child
workers. The comparison of income and wealth between working and nonworking children
shows that the average household monthly income29 for nonworking children is higher than that
of working children (1,305 EGP vs. 1,077 EGP). Households of working children are, however,
more than twice as likely to own land with larger sizes in comparison to households of
nonworking children.

29

Throughout this study, I measure household income as the sum of income brought by all household members
excluding income brought by children under the age of 18.
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Table 19: Means and Standard Deviations of Key Variables (N=54,994)
Variables
Nonworking children
Working children
Mean
S.D.
Mean
Child Characteristics
Child is male=1
0.48
0.50
0.76
Child age
11.27
3.22
13.84
Child goes to school=1
0.94
0.24
0.62
Child years of schooling
5.19
3.20
6.14
Household Characteristics
Urban=1
HH size
Age of the head of household
Education of the head of household
Head was a child laborer=1
Mother currently work=1
Single parent HH=1
HH monthly income (in EGP)*
HH monthly income per capita*
Ln(HH monthly income)
Own land=1
Size of land holdings (in hectares)ǂǂ
Own livestock=1
Observations

0.54
5.90
44.28
7.60
0.20
0.33
0.06
1,305.39
231.70
6.67
0.18
0.77
0.34
48,444

0.50
1.60
7.77
5.57
0.40
0.47
0.23
8,060.87
1,331.29
0.68
0.38
3.65
0.47

0.28
6.34
46.80
3.94
0.41
0.65
0.09
1,076.55
1,76.40
6.57
0.45
1.96
0.71
6,550

S.D.
0.42
2.64
0.49
3.23

0.45
1.83
8.66
4.72
0.49
0.48
0.28
5,962.18
9,93.90
0.65
0.50
4.87
0.45

*The range of household total monthly income in the data is 100 EGP to 401,996 EGP, while range of income per
capita is 8.3 EGP to 66,666 EGP. ǂǂ The range of the size of land holdings is zero to 99.9 hectares.

The conventional wisdom is that child labor is caused by poverty, and this is broadly
accurate. Table 19 shows that average household monthly income is higher for nonworking
children compared to child laborers. Figure 15 below depicts the relationship between child labor
and the percentiles of household income per capita. The figure shows that although child labor
falls as income rises, a substantial number of households in the higher income percentiles engage
their children in work. Moreover, almost 85 percent of children in households in the lowest
income percentile are not child laborers. This figure suggests that income is only part of the story
and that other factors also contribute to child labor.
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Figure 15: Relationship between Child Labor and Income Percentiles

This chapter explores the types of child’s work chosen by higher-income households and
lower-income households and whether there are systematic differences in the nature of work
chosen by each of them. The existence of this difference would suggest a heterogeneity in
parents’ motivations to send their children to work, which is reflected in parental choices of the
types of child’s work. In particular, higher income households may perceive nonpecuniary
returns to child’s work and therefore opt for types of child’s work that may have small monetary
returns but provide a safe and relatively non-demanding working environment for their children.
To investigate this hypothesis, I disaggregate the population of working children using several
criteria in a way that is believed to differentiate the severity of the work. I then examine the
relationship between household income and child labor for each group of working children.
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In particular, Table 20 disaggregates the population of working children based on five
dimensions: work intensity (light economic activity vs. child labor-ILO), hazard exposure
(hazardous work vs. nonhazardous work), age at first job (started work as a teen 12-17 vs. started
work as a kid under 12), work pattern (work in school break only vs. full-year work), and type of
employer (family work vs. market work).
Panel (1) in Table 20 shows the disaggregation of working children based on work
intensity. As mentioned earlier, the ILO definition of child labor includes children under age 12
and employed for at least one hour per week in any type of work (excluding household chores),
those ages 12-14 employed for 14 or more hours per week, and children under 18 engaged in
hazardous work. Employed children age 12-14 who work for less than 14 hours per week and
children age 15-17 not involved in hazardous work are not considered child laborers under the
ILO definition. Panel (1) shows that 81 percent of working children in the sample are child
laborers based on the ILO definition, whereas 19 percent of working children are considered
economically active but not child laborers. The average household monthly income per capita is
3.1 percent higher for households where children are engaged in light economic activities
compared to households where children are defined by the ILO as child laborers.
Panel (2) shows the disaggregation of working children based on hazard exposure. As
indicated earlier, the ENCLS survey asked working children about several hazardous conditions
they may face at work and children answered yes or no to each of them. The most common types
of hazards in the data include exposure to dust and fumes, exposure to extreme cold or heat at
work, unavailability of bathrooms at work, exhaustion, and bending for a long time. The
disaggregation based on hazard exposure in panel (2) shows that the majority of working
children (about 67 percent) in Egypt are exposed to some hazardous conditions during work.
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Rich households are less likely to engage their children in a hazardous work compared to poor
households. In particular, the household monthly income per capita for children working in
hazardous work is 15 percent less than the household monthly income per capita for children
working in nonhazardous work.
Panel (3) shows the distribution of working children by age at the first job. The survey
asked working children about their ages when they first started to work. I use age 12 as a cutoff
age consistent with the ILO’s definition of child labor. As mentioned before, a working child
under age 12 is defined by the ILO as a child laborer regardless of the type or the intensity of
work. This implies that children at this age are considered very young to perform any job.
Therefore, I consider children who started to work under 12 years old as very young to work.
The majority of working children in the data (59 percent) begun to work under age 12. These
children tend to live in low-income households. In particular, the household monthly income per
capita for children who started work as kids under 12 is 28.4 percent less than the household
monthly income per capita for children who entered the labor market as adolescents aged 12-17.
Panel (4) shows the distribution of working children by work pattern. Working children
at the time of the survey were asked if they had worked in each single month of the past 12
months. About 55 percent of working children who were economically active during the week
before the survey had also worked in the past 12 months. Of these children, about 48 percent
reported working most of the months last year (worked ten months or more). The remaining 7
percent reported working only during the summer months (Jun, July, and August). These months
coincide with the end of school year in Egypt. Almost all the children (about 98 percent) who
work only in the summer go to school. Furthermore, these children live in households where
monthly income per capita is 78.2 percent higher than the household monthly income per capita
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for children who work in full-year jobs. In fact, the average household income per capita for
children who work only during their school break is surprisingly 37 percent higher than the
household income per capita for children who are not engaged in any work.
Panel (5) in Table 20 shows the distribution of working children by type of employer.
The survey asked child workers whether they worked as employees, owned account workers,
employers, or were unpaid family workers. The latter excluded household chores. Almost all the
children were either employed in the formal labor market or unpaid family workers. About 62
percent of the working children worked for their families; whereas 38 percent were employees in
the formal labor market. Table 33 in Appendix C shows the distribution of working children by
the type of place at which they work. Among children working for their families, about 70
percent carried out their work on farms. On the other hand, among children engaged in a market
work, only 26 percent carried out their work on farms. The remaining market work was carried
out in factories, offices, retail establishments and shops, and construction sites.
As can be seen from Panel (5), the income of households where children are engaged in
family production is quite lower than the income of households where children work in the
formal market. This could be due to the fact that I focus the analysis on monthly cash income.
Parents of unpaid family workers are themselves less likely to have jobs in the formal market.
Besides, a considerable portion of the farm production is usually consumed by the farming
households in developing countries. Any additional sales of agricultural products does not
usually occur on a monthly basis, and hence the revenues may not appear as a monthly income.
These households are, however, more likely to own lands and livestock compared to the
households where children work in the formal labor market.30

30

I control for household’s ownership of lands and livestock in all my regression models.
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Table 20: Distribution of Working Children and Household Income Per capita (N=6,550)
Average monthly family income per
%Working children
capita *
1) Work intensity
- Light work
18.98
180.82
- Child laborers (ILO)
81.02
175.36
2) Hazard exposure
- Nonhazardous work
- Hazardous work

32.63
67.37

193.40
168.16

3) Age at first Job
- Teens 12-17
- kids under 12

41.18
58.82

202.81
157.91

4) Work pattern**
- Work in summer only
- Work most of the year

7.47
48.14

317.50
178.22

5) Type of employer
- Family work
- Market work

61.71
38.29

174.73
179.10

*The average monthly household income per capita for nonworking children is 231.70 EGP.
**about 55 percent of children who worked last week had participated in the labor market in the past 12 months.

It is worth mentioning that there is some overlaps between these work dimensions. Table
34 in Appendix C shows the joint distribution of these groups. As can be seen from the table,
there is an overlap between work intensity, hazard exposure, and age at first job. In particular,
the majority of child laborers, as defined by the ILO, are engaged in hazardous work and had
started to work when they were kids under 12. In contrast, none of children who are engaged in
light workloads face hazardous conditions during work and the majority of them had started to
work when they were adolescents age 12-17. This implies that child laborers and children
engaged in light work are not only different in the intensity of work but they are also differ in
exposure to hazards and their ages at first job. Therefore, the difference in the effect of income
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between these two groups will capture the difference in three dimensions without being able to
isolate the effect of each. This is not, however, expected to be problematic as the differences
between the two groups are consistent in a way that describes the unfavorable work conditions.
Therefore, the estimated combined effect will be quite meaningful.
Table 34 also shows an overlap between type of the employer and the age at first job. In
particular, children who started to work as kids are mostly working for their families, while
children who started to work as adolescents mostly work in the formal market. This case raises a
concern of mixed effects that might cancel each other or revise the expected effects. Children
working for their families are generally considered to be better off in comparison to children who
work in the formal market. However, children starting to work as kids under 12 are considered to
be worse off in comparison to children staring to work as adolescents. Isolating the effect of each
work dimension (type of employer and age at work) requires comparing groups that are similar
except in one dimension. That is, comparing children who work for their families and children
who work in the market such that both groups had started to work at the same age. Likewise,
comparing children who joined the labor market as kids and those who joined the market as
adolescents such that both groups work for the same employer. The limited sample size,
however, makes it quite difficult to conduct that detailed subanalyses.

5. Methodology
Most of the empirical studies have modeled child’s work and schooling separately using
limited dependent variable models such as Logit or Probit models (Edmonds, 2007). This
approach, however, may produce biased estimates if the decisions of child’s work and schooling
are jointly determined by children’s unobservable ability and omitted household characteristics.
An alternative to the univariate independent models is the bivariate Probit model, which is
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implemented in this chapter. This model has the advantage of accounting for the correlation
between the error terms in schooling and child labor regressions. That is, the bivariate Probit
regression takes into account that household and child unobservable characteristics affect both
child labor and schooling decisions. In particular, I model child labor, 𝐶𝑖𝑟 , and child schooling,
𝑆𝑖𝑟 , jointly as two binary dependent variables. 𝐶𝑖𝑟 is a binary variable equal to one if child 𝑖 in
household 𝑟 works and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝑖𝑟 is a binary variable equal one if child 𝑖 in household 𝑟
goes to school and zero otherwise.
These two binary variables correspond to the two continuous latent variables 𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 and
𝑆 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 , respectively. It is assumed that each observed variable, C and S, takes on the value one if its
latent variable takes on a positive value, as follows:
𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑟 + 𝛼2 𝑋𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼3 𝑋𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟 ,
𝑆 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑟 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑟 + 𝜐𝑖𝑟 ,

(1)
(2)

where
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 > 0
0
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,

(3)

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 > 0
𝑆𝑖𝑟 = {
0
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,

(4)

𝐶𝑖𝑟 = {

and
[

𝜀𝑖𝑟
0 1
] | 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠~𝒩 ([ ] , [
0 𝜌
𝜐𝑖𝑟

𝜌
]).
1

(5)

Where 𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 and 𝑆 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 are latent variables for child work and child schooling, respectively.
log( 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) is the logarithm of household 𝑟 monthly income. I exclude from this
measure all the income brought by children under the age of 18. 𝑋𝑖𝑟 is a vector of child-level
characteristics, which includes child gender and child age. 𝑋𝑟 is a vector of household
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𝑟 characteristics, which includes an urban dummy, family size, education of the head of the
household, a dummy for whether the head of the household was a child laborer, a dummy if a
child’s mother works, a dummy for single-parent household, a dummy for whether a household
owns livestock, and the size of agricultural land. Both 𝛼 and 𝛽 are vectors of parameters. 𝜀𝑖𝑟 and
𝜐𝑖𝑟 are errors terms that are assumed to be correlated with correlation 𝜌.
I estimate the bivariate Probit model specified in Eq.1- Eq.5 for all working children as
the first step in my analysis. In the next step, I disaggregate the population of working children
and run two separate bivariate Probit regressions for each of the five work dimensions mentioned
earlier. For example, for the type of employer dimension, I run two separate bivariate Probit
regressions for family work and market work. In the bivariate Probit regression for family work,
the dependent variable, 𝐶𝑖𝑟 , equal to one if a child works in a family business and zero if the
child does not work at all. Similarly, in the bivariate Probit regression for market work, the
dependent variable, 𝐶𝑖𝑟 , equal to one if a child works in the market and zero if the child does not
work. Therefore, in each regression, the group of nonworking children is used as the comparison
group. Using nonworking children as the comparison group for both regressions helps
controlling for any differences in child or household characteristics between the groups of
market-work child workers and family-work child workers, and therefore, makes it possible to
compare the effect of income on child labor between these two separate regressions.
I repeat this analysis for the other work dimensions. Disaggregating the population of
working children helps explain the sources of the change in child labor as income increases. For
example, if the aggregate bivariate Probit model shows that child work decreases as income
increases, the heterogeneous analysis would describe which types of child work are most
sensitive to the changes in income.

99

One concern about this analysis is the potential endogeneity of household income. That
is, poor households differ from rich households in many ways that might be associated with
income and child labor decision. Parental noncognitive skills and family background are
expected to confound the relationship between household income and child labor. To handle the
endogeneity of the income, one needs to extract an exogenous variation in family income that is
uncorrelated with household’s unobservable characteristics.
In this chapter, I use measures of shocks in households’ income over the past 12 months
to create an exogenous variation in income. In particular the ENCLS survey asked all households
if they experienced a fall in their income over the past 12 months due to any of these reasons:
loss of employment of any member, bankruptcy of a family business, illness or serious accident
of a working member, death of a working member, abandonment by the household head, fire in
house/business/property, criminal act by a household member, land dispute, loss of cash support
or in-kind assistance, fall in prices of products of the household business, loss of harvest, and
loss of livestock. The percentages of households facing each of these income shocks are shown
in Table 35 in Appendix C. The most common reasons for the fall in income over the past 12
months are illness or serious accidents of a working member (7.1 percent) and the loss of
employment of any member (3.25 percent).
Some of the reasons for the decrease in income might, however, be correlated with
households’ behaviors. For example, the loss of employment of any member, bankruptcy of a
family business, abandonment by the household head, criminal act by household member, fire in
house/business/property, and land dispute are all expected to be consequences of some actions
taken by households. Whether a household experiences any of these shocks is not expected to be
entirely random of households’ characteristics. Additionally, some of the others reasons are
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expected to affect only a specific group of households based on their eligibility or ownership of
assets such as loss of cash support or in-kind assistance, fall in prices of products of the
household business, loss of harvest, and loss of livestock.
In this chapter, I focus on two sources of income decline as the source of the exogenous
variation in income. Specifically, I use illness/serious accident of a working member and the
death of a working member. In particular, I create a dummy variable that equal 1 if a household
faced one of these two accidents over the past 12 months and zero otherwise. About 7.73 percent
of households in the sample (7.1 percent faced illness/serious accidents while 0.63 percent faced
a death of a working member) faced one of these two events in the last year. I us this dummy
variable to instrument family income in Eq. 1 and Eq.2 above.
One concern about this instrumental variable is that despite the fact that the probability of
death is expected to affect both rich and poor people households, old people have higher
probability of death than young people. Table 21 below shows that rich parents are slightly older
than poor parents because the rich have, on average, higher life expectancy. To account for this
difference, I control for the age of the head of household in the regressions. Even with
controlling for the differences in age, poor parents are expected to have higher probabilities of
sickness and death due to lack of healthcare access. To account for this possibility, I create a
wealth index using households’ ownerships of assets and durable goods and add the quintiles of
this index to the set of control variables. Controlling for the wealth index quintiles allows me to
examine the effect of a recent shock in monthly income on child labor within a wealth quintile.
That is, the exogenous variation that is being extracted in this chapter comes from the change in
the monthly income (the flow) conditional on the wealth (the stock).
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The ENCLS survey asked households many questions about their house characteristics
and their ownerships of durable goods. Table 36 in Appendix C provides a detailed description
of the variables used in the computation of the wealth index. These variables include the type of
dwelling; the ownership of dwelling; the size of dwelling; the number of rooms per household
member; the availability of bathrooms and kitchens; the type of toilet; the source of energy for
cooking, heating, cooling, and lightening; the main source for drinking water; and a set of
indicator variables for household ownership of durable goods such as air-condition, automobile,
washing machine, TV, and mobile phone. I use the principal component analysis to combine
these variables into a single index called the wealth index31.
Altogether, I re-estimate the bivariate Probit regression of Eq.1- Eq.5 using the created
instrumental variable to instrument family income, controlling for the age of the head of the
household and the wealth quintiles, as follows.
𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑟 + 𝛾2 𝑋𝑖𝑟 + 𝛾3 𝑋𝑟 + 𝛾4 𝑎𝑔_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑟 +
8

𝛾𝑘 ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ_𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑘 + 𝜔𝑖𝑟 ,

(7)

𝑘=5

𝑆 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑟 + 𝜋2 𝑋𝑖𝑟 + 𝜋3 𝑋𝑟 + 𝜋4 𝑎𝑔_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑟 +
8

𝜋𝑘 ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ_𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑘 + 𝜑𝑖𝑟 ,

(8)

𝑘=5

The first stage is specified as follow,
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑟 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝐼𝑉𝑟 + 𝛿2 𝑋𝑖𝑟 + 𝛿3 𝑋𝑟 + 𝛿4 𝑎𝑔_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑟 +
𝛿𝑘 ∑8𝑘=5 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ_𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑘 + 𝜖𝑟

(9)

31

The wealth index is a measure of the living standards, similar to the one computed in the DHS survey. For more
information on the construction of the wealth index, please see Rutstein and Johnson (2004). I implement the principal
components analysis using the Stata factor analysis procedure, implemented using the Stata program “pca”. In this
analysis and in all the regressions in this chapter, I account for the complexity of the survey setting through using the
Stata prefix command “svy” to correct variance estimates.
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where 𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 , 𝑆 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 , 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑟 , 𝑋𝑖𝑟 , and 𝑋𝑟 are defined as before. 𝐼𝑉𝑟 is an
instrumental variable that equals one if household 𝑟 faced either illness/serious accident or a
death of a working member over the past 12 months and zero otherwise. 𝑎𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑟 is the age of
the head of household 𝑟. ∑8𝑘=5 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑘 is a set of four indicator variables representing
the upper four quintiles of the wealth index (the excluded lowest quintile represents the baseline
group). 𝜔𝑖𝑟 , 𝜑𝑖𝑟 , and 𝜖𝑟 are error terms.
I apply the instrumental variable (IV) analysis using the two-stage residual inclusion
(2SRI) approach introduced by Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008). The 2SRI is an IV-based
approach to correcting for endogeneity bias in nonlinear models. Terza et al. (2008) show that
extending the popular linear two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to nonlinear models (such
as bivariate Probit models) results in inconsistent estimates. The 2SRI estimator has the same
first-stage (Eq.9 above) as the linear 2SLS, where I regress the endogenous variable (logarithm
of family income) on the instrumental variable along with other control variables from the main
equation. In the second-stage regression, however, the logarithm of family income variable is not
replaced with its predicted values from the first stage, as is the case with the linear 2SLS.
Instead, the first-stage residuals are included as additional regressors in the second-stage
estimation32. In symbols, the second stage bivariate Probit regression under Terza’s approach is
specified as follow,

32

Following the recommendation of Terza et al. (2008), the standard errors of the 2SRI estimator are obtained via
bootstrapping using 2,000 replications.
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𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑟 + 𝛾2 𝑋𝑖𝑟 + 𝛾3 𝑋𝑟 + 𝛾4 𝑎𝑔_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑟 +
8

𝛾𝑘 ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ_𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑘 + 𝛾9 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑟 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟 ,

(10)

𝑘=5

𝑆 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑟 + 𝜋2 𝑋𝑖𝑟 + 𝜋3 𝑋𝑟 + 𝜋4 𝑎𝑔_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑟 +
8

𝜋𝑘 ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ_𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑘 + 𝜋9 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑟 + 𝜏𝑖𝑟 ,

(11)

𝑘=5

where 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑟 is the first stage residuals generated from Eq.9 above.
I estimate the bivariate Probit model above for all working children and for the
subpopulations of working children, separately, as specified before. It is worth mentioning that
using this instrumental variable limits the ability to explore the heterogeneous effects of income
by dimension of child’s age at first job. To illustrate, the exogenous variation in income is
created from an income shock over the past 12 months prior to the survey. The average working
child in the sample has started to work three years prior to the time of the survey33. Thus,
children have joined the labor market before the occurrence of the income shock, and so this
exogenous variation may not predict child’s age at first job.

Table 21: Age of the Head of the Household, Child Labor, and Child Schooling
Quintiles of family
monthly income per capita
1st income quintile
2nd income quintile
3rd income quintile
4th income quintile
5th income quintile

Average age of
household head
43.52
43.52
44.18
45.05
46.74

% Children
going to school
15.70
13.44
11.90
9.74
8.54

% Children
going to work
85.20
88.83
90.30
91.89
94.19

This table is computed using the NCLS Survey.

33

Children who started to work under age 12 have spent about four years in the labor market by the time of the
survey; whereas, children who started to work as adolescent have spent about two years in the labor market by the
time of the survey. Thus, both groups had started to work before the occurrence of the income shock.
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6. Results
6.1. Baseline Results: Aggregate Analysis Ignoring Endogeneity

Table 22 below shows the results of the bivariate Probit regression ignoring the
endogeneity of income. The first row combines all the working children in one group in a way
similar to the majority of previous studies. The following five panels disaggregate the population
of working children based on work intensity, hazard exposure, age at the first job, work pattern,
and the type of employer. The estimates in this table represent the average marginal effects
(AME) of the logarithm of family monthly income on the marginal probabilities of child labor
and schooling. The AME for all regressors are presented in Tables 37 - 47 in Appendix C.
The first two columns of Table 22 present the result of independent Probit models;
whereas the last two columns show the findings from the bivariate Probit regressions. The results
of the two models are very close with slight changes in magnitudes. The estimated correlation
parameter between the error terms of the schooling and child labor equations (𝜌) is, however,
statistically significant. This suggests that the bivariate Probit model is a better fit than the
independent Probit models. Therefore, I focus my discussion on the results of the bivariate Probit
regression.
The results from the aggregate analysis in the first row show that if family monthly
income increases by one percent, other factors held constant, a child will be 0.018 percentage
points less likely to work and 0.009 percentage points more likely to go to school. These effects
are statistically significant at 99 confidence level. This finding is consistent with the literature
that found that poverty or negative economic shocks are important factors driving children to
work. In particular, the result in this section is consistent with Beegle et al. (2006), Edmonds
(2005), and Wahba (2006).
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As can be seen, the effect of income on school attendance is smaller than the effect of
income on child labor. That is, there is a small difference between the poor and the rich in the
probability of enrolling their children into school compared to the difference in the probability of
child labor. This can be justified by the fact that the majority of children (90 percent) in the
sample go to school (Table 18)34. There are some differences in school enrollment rate across
income levels as can be seen from the second column of Table 21. These differences, however,
are relatively smaller than the differences in child labor rates (the third column of Table 21).
6.2. Baseline Results: Heterogeneous Analysis Ignoring Endogeneity
Panel (1) through panel (5) of Table 22 present the results of the subpopulation analysis.
In particular, panel (1) divides the population of working children based on the ILO’s definition
of child labor. That is, I run the bivariate Probit regression, separately, for child laborers-ILO and
children performing light economic activity. For each group, the 𝐶𝑖𝑟 is equal to one if a child is
engaged in a work defined by that group and zero if the child does not work at all. The results in
panel (1) indicate that, on average, a one-percent increase in household monthly income reduces
the probability that a child is only economically active –relative to not performing any work—
by 0.003 percentage points, other factors held constant. The reduction in the probability of child
labor-ILO relative to the nonworking status, however, is six times greater than this estimate
(0.018 versus 0.003 percent). Both estimates are statistically significant. These results suggest
that most of the reduction in child’s work as income increases (the findings of the aggregate
analysis) comes from the reduction in the worst forms of child, as defined by the ILO35.

34

In fact, primary school enrolment in Egypt reached 96 percent in the school year 2008/2009 (United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), 2010).
35
Considering the overlapping between different dimensions of child’ work, discussed earlier, the worst forms of
child labor combine heavy workloads, hazardous work, and work performed by kids under 12.
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The findings from the schooling equations show that a child is more likely to attend
school as household income increases, other factors held constant. The increase in the probability
of school attendance for child laborers-ILO is higher than the increase in the probability of
school attendance for children engaged in light economic activity. This is consistent with the
results from the child work equation. In particular, there are small differences in income and in
school attendance between nonworking children and children working in light economic activity.
There are, however, substantial differences in income and school attendance between
nonworking children and child laborers36.
In panel (2), I divide working children by hazard exposure during work. The results show
that as income increases, other factors held constant, children are less likely to work regardless
of the level of hazard at work. The reduction in the probability of hazardous work, however, is
more than twice as much as the reduction in the probability of nonhazardous work (0.016
percentage points versus 0.006 percentage points). As can be seen, the results from the work
intensity and the hazard exposure dimensions are very consistent due to the overlapping between
them. Along similar lines, results in panel (3) show that as incomes increase, children are less
likely to enter the labor market at young ages. The reduction in the probability of starting work
as a child under 12 is almost twice as large as the reduction in the probability of starting work as
an adolescent.

36

This intuition is also true for other work dimensions. That is, there are small differences in school attendance between
nonworking children and children who work in family businesses and in jobs not highly physical, jobs nonhazardous,
and jobs during school breaks. In contrast, there are considerable differences in school attendance between nonworking
children and children who work in market work, jobs that are physical, hazardous jobs, and full-year jobs.
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The results in panels (4) and (5) classify working children based on work pattern and type
of employer, respectively. As can be seen from panel (4), there are no significant differences
between the poor and the rich in the probability of engaging their children in work during their
summer school break. The rich, however, are eight times less likely than the poor to engage their
children in full-year jobs. The last panel shows the disaggregation of working children by type of
employer. The results in panel (5) show that the rich are one and one-half times less likely to
engage their children into a market work relative to family work37.

37

As discussed earlier, there is some overlap between the type of employer and the age at first job dimensions. That
is, children who started to work as kids mostly work for their families, while children who started work as adolescents
mostly participate in the formal labor market. This could justify the smaller differential effects for these two
dimensions compared to the other dimensions. Controlling for the type of employer in panel (3) could increase the
differential effect of income in the favor of work started after age 12. Similarly, controlling for the difference in ages
at first job in panel (5) could increase the differential effect of income in the favor of family work.
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Table 22: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Monthly Income
Independent Probit
Bivariate Probit
Sample
Work
School
Work
School
-0.018***
0.009***
All Working children (N=54,994) -0.018*** 0.008***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
S.E.
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
P-Value
1) Work intensity
-0.003*
0.005**
-0.003*
0.005**
Light economic activity (n=49,687)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
S.E.
[0.082]
[0.011]
[0.082]
[0.011]
P-Value
-0.018*** 0.007***
-0.018***
0.008***
Child laborers (ILO) (n=53,751)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
S.E.
P-Value
[0.000]
[0.002]
[0.000]
[0.002]
2) Hazard exposure
-0.006*** 0.006***
-0.006***
0.006***
Nonhazardous work (n=50,581)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
S.E.
[0.005]
[0.008]
[0.005]
[0.008]
P-Value
-0.016*** 0.007***
-0.016***
0.008***
Hazardous work (n=52,857)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
S.E.
P-Value
[0.000]
[0.001]
[0.000]
[0.001]
3) Age at first Job
-0.008*** 0.006**
-0.008***
0.006***
Teens 12-17 (n=51,141)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
S.E.
[0.000]
[0.008]
[0.000]
[0.008]
P-Value
-0.014*** 0.007***
-0.014***
0.007***
Kids under 12 (n=52,297)
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.002)
S.E.
P-Value
[0.000]
[0.002]
[0.000]
[0.002]
4) Work pattern
-0.001
0.004**
-0.001
0.004**
Summer work (n=48,933)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
S.E.
[0.369]
[0.041]
[0.369]
[0.041]
P-Value
-0.008*** 0.007***
-0.008***
0.007***
Work all the year (n=51,597)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
S.E.
P-Value
[0.000]
[0.003]
[0.000]
[0.003]
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Table 22: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Monthly Income (cont’d)
Sample
5) Type of employer
Unpaid Family work (n=52,486)
S.E.
P-Value
Market work (n=50,952)
S.E.
P-Value

Independent Probit
Work
School
-0.008**
(0.003)
[0.011]
-0.012***
(0.002)
[0.000]

0.004*
(0.002)
[0.027]
0.009***
(0.003)
[0.001]

Bivariate Probit
Work
School
-0.008**
(0.003)
[0.011]
-0.012***
(0.002)
[0.000]

0.005**
(0.002)
[0.027]
0.009***
(0.003)
[0.001]

In all regressions I control for child gender, child age, an urban dummy, a dummy for single-parent household,
family size, education of the head of the household, a dummy for whether the head of the household was a child
laborer, a dummy if a child’s mother works, a dummy for whether a household owns livestock, and size of
agricultural land. I account for the complexity of survey design through prefixing the Stata estimation commands
with “svy”. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99 percent confidence level, ** refers to the
95 percent confidence level, and * refers to the 90 percent confidence level.

6.3. Results from the Instrumental Variable Analysis

This section presents the results of the instrumental variable analysis using the two-stage
residual inclusion approach introduced by Terza et al. (2008). In particular, I create an indicator
variable equal to one if a household faced a shock in income over the past 12 months due to a
death of a working member or illness/serious accident, and zero otherwise. As explained in
section 4, I also create a wealth index and add it to the set of control variables to account for the
differences between the poor and the rich in the probabilities of death and sickness. The results
of the first stage and second regressions are shown in Tables 23 and 24, respectively. The first
two columns in each table present the results without controlling for the wealth index; whereas,
the last two columns control for the wealth index. As can be seen, controlling for wealth slightly
reduces the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients but does not change the main
results. The discussion in this section is focused on the findings of the IV regressions controlling
for the wealth index to account for potential selection into illness, serious accidents, or death.
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Table 23 shows that, holding other things constant, a household with a working member
who was sick, had a serious accident, or died last year experienced 14 percent reduction in its
monthly income in comparison to a household who did not experience this shock. Controlling for
wealth reduces this estimate from 15.6 percent to 14 percent. Both estimates are statistically
significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

Table 23: First Stage Regression: the Effect of a Recent Shock on Household Income
Without controlling for
Controlling
wealth
for wealth
Estimate
-0.156***
-0.140***
S.E.
(0.022)
(0.022)
P-value
[0.000]
[0.000]
R-squared
0.1459
0.177
No. of observations
54,994
54,994
I control for child gender, child age, an urban dummy, family size, education of the head of the household, a dummy
for whether the head of the household was a child laborer, the age of the head of the household, a dummy if a child’s
mother works, a dummy for single-parent household, a dummy for whether a household owns livestock, size of
agricultural land, the age of the head of the household, and the highest four quintiles of the wealth index. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses *** refers to the 99 percent confidence level, ** refers to the 95 percent confidence
level, and * refers to the 90 percent confidence level.

The results of the bivariate Probit regressions using the instrumental variable are shown
in Table 24. As can be seen from the aggregate analysis of all working children, each one percent
increase in household monthly income reduces the probability of child’s work by 0.101
percentage points, which is more than five times bigger than the estimate (0.018 percent)
obtained from the baseline bivariate Probit model in Table 22. This estimate is statistically
significant at 99 percent confidence level. The subpopulation analysis is presented in panel (1)
through panel (4). I focus the analysis in this section on four work dimensions: work intensity,
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hazard exposure, work pattern, and the type of employer. As discussed before, the age at first job
dimension is excluded from this analysis because children had entered the labor market before
the occurrence of the income shock and therefore, the exogenous variation is not appropriate to
predict the variations in this outcome.
Disaggregating the population of working children in panels 1 through 4 shows that work
intensity and hazard exposure are the most significant dimensions where the effect of income
differs. In particular, panel (1) shows that each one percent increase in income reduces the
probability that a child is engaged in a heavy workload (Child labor –ILO) by 0.094 percentage
points, which is statistically significant at 95 percent confidence level. The increase in income
has an insignificant effect on the probability that a child is engaged in a light economic activity.
In particular, the effect of income on child labor-ILO is almost seven times as large as the effect
on light economic activity. Panel (2) shows the results of the subpopulation analysis by hazard
exposure. The results show that each one percent increase in income reduces the probability that
a child is engaged in a hazardous work by 0.104 percentage points, which is again statistically
significant at 95 percent confidence level. The increase in income, however, has a small and
insignificant effect on the probability of engaging a child in nonhazardous work.
It is worth mentioning that the effect of income on the probability of school attendance is
statistically insignificant in the regression of all working children and for all subpopulations
regressions. One potential explanation might be related to the nature of the instrumental variable
that is being used to create the exogenous variation in household income. In particular, I use
recent accidents (illness, serious accidents, or death) occurred to working members in households
as the source of exogenous variation in household monthly income. Given the universal primary
school enrollment in Egypt, parents are less likely not to enroll their children in school or
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withdraw them out of the school in a response to a recent income shock that might be
temporarily. That is, school attendance is nonresponsive to income shocks in the short run.
Another explanation is that the effect of income on school attendance might have opposite
effects for subpopulations of children (males versus females; urban versus rural), that are
canceled out at the aggregate level. To investigate this explanation and to further explore the
heterogeneous effects of income on child’s work, the next sections present the results of separate
analyses by child’s gender and region.
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Table 24: Bivariate Probit Model (with IV): AME of Household Monthly Income
Without controlling
Controlling
for wealth
for wealth
Sample
Work
School
Work
School
All Working children (N=54,994)
-0.105***
0.025
-0.101**
0.008
S.E.
(0.036)
(0.029)
(0.040)
(0.033)
P-value
[0.004]
[0.382]
[0.011]
[0.818]
1) Work intensity
Light work (n=49,687)
S.E.
P-value
Child laborers (ILO) (n=53,751)
S.E.
P-value
2) Hazard exposure
Nonhazardous work (n=50,581)
S.E.
P-value
Hazardous work (n=52,857)
S.E.
P-value
3) Work pattern
Summer work (n=48,933)
S.E.
P-value
Work all the year (n=51,597)
S.E.
P-value

-0.014
(0.019)
[0.459]

0.010
(0.024)
[0.662]

-0.014
(0.022)
[0.530]

-0.005
(0.027)
[0.854]

-0.101***
(0.031)
[0.001]

0.023
(0.029)
[0.427]

-0.094**
(0.036)
[0.010]

0.030
(0.037)
[0.417]

-0.008
(0.023)
[0.728]

0.005
(0.025)
[0.854]

-0.004
(0.027)
[0.873]

-0.012
(0.028)
[0.673]

-0.103***
(0.029)
[0.000]

0.030
(0.028)
[0.282]

-0.104***
(0.034)
[0.002]

0.014
(0.031)
[0.657]

0.009
(0.012)
[0.450]

0.009
(0.023)
[0.699]

0.012
(0.014)
[0.383]

-0.005
(0.025)
[0.832]

0.008
(0.027)
[0.765]

0.019
(0.028)
[0.496]

0.017
(0.031)
[0.583]

-0.001
(0.031)
[0.981]
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Table 24: Bivariate Probit Model (with IV): AME of Household Monthly Income (cont’d)
Without controlling
Controlling
for wealth
for wealth
Sample
Work
School
Work
School
4) Type of employer
Unpaid Family work (n=52,486)
-0.065**
0.037
-0.066*
0.027
S.E.
(0.029)
(0.025)
(0.034)
(0.029)
P-value
[0.028]
[0.137]
[0.050]
[0.353]
Market work (n=50,952)
S.E.
P-value

-0.044*
(0.022)
[0.044]

0.001
(0.026)
[0.974]

-0.040
(0.025)
[0.108]

-0.020
(0.030)
[0.506]

This model is estimated using the two-stage residual inclusion approach introduced by Terza et al. (2008) (see the
text). I control for child gender, child age, an urban dummy, family size, education of the head of the household, a
dummy for whether the head of the household was a child laborer, the age of the head of the household, a dummy if
a child’s mother works, a dummy for single-parent household, a dummy for whether a household owns livestock,
size of agricultural land, the age of the head of the household, the highest four quintiles of the wealth index, and the
first-stage residuals from Eq.9. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99 percent confidence
level, ** refers to the 95 percent confidence level, and * refers to the 90 percent confidence level.

6.4. Exploring Gender Differences
This section presents the results of the instrumental variable analysis by gender. Table 48
in Appendix C shows the result of this analysis. The results of this analysis show that the
increase in income decreases the probability of child’s work for both males and females. The
reduction, however, is higher for males than females. This can be explained by the fact that the
percentage of child’s work among males is more than three times as large the percentage of
female child workers (17.7 percent versus 5.8 percent). Thus, the increase in income is expected
to be more pronounced and influential in the population of male child workers compared to
female child workers. Despite the bigger magnitudes, the effect of income on child’s work is less
statistically significant for males compared to females. This might be because the population of
male child workers is larger than the population of female child workers, and so, the variations in
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parental income is expected to be larger in the male equation. As can be seen from the results,
the standard error of the AME of income in the male equation is 0.082; whereas, the standard
error in the female equation is 0.05, despite the fact the number of male child worker is more
than three times the number of female child’s workers.
The disaggregation of child workers by work dimensions, for both males and females
confirms the same finding of Table 24 above. That is, both work intensity (child labor-ILO
versus light activity) and hazard exposure (hazardous versus nonhazardous work) are the most
two significant criteria where parental income has heterogonous effects. As can be seen, for male
equation, the reduction in the probability of child labor-ILO is more than sixteen times as large
as the reduction in the probability of light economic activity; and the reduction in the probability
of hazardous work is more than five times as large as the reduction in the probability of
nonhazardous work. The same pattern also holds in case of female equation.
Examining the effect of income on the probability of school attendance shows that the
changes in income have insignificant effects for both male and female children. The estimated
effects for the female equation are, however, negative, whereas, the estimated effects for the
male equation are mostly positive. This might explain the insignificant effects of income on
school attendance in the aggregate equation, as the opposite signs might cancel each other at the
aggregate level. The opposite signs of these estimates might indicate that parents are more likely
to respond to an income shock by withdrawing male children from school to help in the labor
market but they might be reluctant to withdraw their young girls due to the lack of suitable jobs
for girls. Parents in this case might also compensate for the reduction in total household
education by educating more girls. The effects of income on school attendance in both male and
female equations are, however, small and not statistically significant.
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6.5. Exploring Regional Differences

This section presents the results of the instrumental variable analysis by region. The
results are shown in Table 49 in Appendix C. As can be seen, the increase in income reduces the
probability of child’s work in both urban and rural areas. The magnitude of the reduction is,
however, higher in rural areas than urban areas (-0.119 versus -0.080). Similar to the argument in
the previous section, the percentage of child workers in rural areas is higher than urban areas
(17.3 percent versus 6.7 percent), and thus, the effect of income is expected to be more
influential in rural areas. Despite the large magnitude, the estimated effect in rural areas is not
however statistically significant compared to the estimated effect in urban areas. Similar also to
the argument in the previous section, the insignificant results might be driven by the fact that the
large population of working children in rural areas exhibits large variations in household income
compared to the urban areas. As can be seen, the standard error of the AME of the income effect
in the rural equation is 0.083 compared to 0.035 in urban areas, despite the fact that the number
of working children is larger in rural areas.
The results of the disaggregation analysis in panel (1) through panel (4) are also
consistent with the findings in the previous sections. In particular, both work intensity and hazard
exposure are the most important dimensions where the effect of income differs. In rural areas,
the reduction in the probability of child labor-ILO as income increases is 131 times as the large
as the reduction in the probability of light economic activity; and the reduction in the probability
of hazardous work is more than six times as large as the reduction in the probability of
nonhazardous work. The similar relative relationships also hold in urban areas with smaller
magnitudes.
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It is worth mentioning that the effect of household income on the probability of school
attendance is negative in rural areas while it is positive in urban areas. The magnitudes are quite
larger in rural areas but they are not statistically significant compared to the urban areas due to
larger standard errors. These findings indicate that the increase in income significantly increases
the probability of school attendance in urban areas but it seems to reduce school attendance in
rural areas. The latter effect is not however statistically significant.

7. Conclusion
In this chapter, I use data from the recently available 2010 Egypt Child Labor Survey to
explore the heterogeneous effects of parental income on child labor. I disaggregate the
population of working children based on several dimensions to differentiate between favorable
versus unfavorable work conditions and analyze the effect of parental income on child labor
within each group. The results from the bivariate Probit regressions show that as incomes
increase, parents are less likely to send their children to work, other factors held constant. The
magnitude of the income effect, however, varies substantially across subpopulations of working
children. In particular, the effect of parental income is minimal among children with light
workloads compared to those with excessive workloads, children who do not face hazards during
work compared to those who work in hazardous conditions, children who entered the labor
market as adolescents age 12-17 compared to children who entered the labor market as kids
under 12, children who work only during school break compared to those who work full-year
jobs, and children who work in unpaid family businesses compared to those who work in the
formal labor market.
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The results of the instrumental variable analysis show that both hazard exposure and the
intensity of work are the most significant work dimensions where household income has
heterogeneous impacts. In particular, the results show that almost all the reduction in child labor
as income increases comes from the reduction in hazardous work and heavy workload. This
finding applies for male and female working children in both urban and rural areas.
The implications from these results is threefold. First, higher family incomes clearly deter
types of child labor most likely to be harmful to children. Second, among households with
moderate or high incomes, child labor is less likely to be harmful and quite possibly helpful to
children and their families. A third implication regards public policy. Prior studies examining
the relationship between income and child labor raised concerns about the effectiveness of
income support policies. The results in this chapter lessen such concerns. Programs that increase
incomes among very poor households who engage their children in the worst forms of child
labor are highly likely to improve child well-being.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Graphs for Chapter I
Table 25: Percentages of Internal Migration in Egypt in 1996 and 2006
Total Sample
Males

Females

Egypt Population Census 1996
% Rural-urban migration
% Urban-rural migration
Total Population

1.6
2.5
2,064,421

1.4
2.1
1,036,520

1.7
2.8
1,027,901

Egypt Population Census 2006
% Rural-urban migration
% Urban-rural migration
Total Population

2.8
1.2
2,784,612

2.7
1.1
1,406,178

3.0
1.3
1,378,434

This table is computed by the authors using data from the Egypt Population, Housing, and Establishment Census
1996 and 2006. I restrict the age of individuals to the same age interval of the analysis: 22-49.

Table 26: Estimating the Discontinuities in Baseline Characteristics: RD Models
Mother’s
Variable
Urban=1
Muslim=1
years of
education
Discontinuity estimate
-0.004
0.001
-0.066
Standard error
(0.013)
(0.007)
(0.38)
P-value
[0.736]
[0.869]
[0.862]
Sample mean
{0.447}
{0.949}
{2.189}
Local sample
26,681
20,808
2,006
Total sample

97,314

74,847

This table is estimated using seven waves of the DHS (1992-2014).
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5,813

Father’s years
of education
-0.693
(0.584)
[0.235]
{4.247}
1,365
3,493

Table 27: The Effect of Female Education on Fertility: Controlling for Husband Education
Local
Local
Poisson (for
Outcomes
Linear
count dependent
variables)
(a) Discontinuity in
education
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local Sample

-0.829
0.137
0.000
6.245
26,673

-

(b) Effect of female
education
1) Number of children born
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local sample

-0.08
0.045
0.077
3.5
18,788

-.116
.047
0.014
3.5
18,788

2) Age at birth (in months)
Estimate
Standard error.
.1365757
Mean
Local sample

0.143
0.116
0.217
267.154
16,937

-

3) Ideal number of children
Estimate
Standard error
P-value
Mean
Local sample

0.012
0.047
0.795
3.027
17,330

.012
.051
0.815
3.027
17,330

This table is estimated using the EDHS data (seven waves), women age 22-49. I estimate local regression models
with a triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 60 months. Standard errors are clustered by primary sampling unit. In all
the regressions, I control for husband education and age at the time of the survey for fertility outcomes except age at
first birth.
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Table 28: Average Years of Education of Women by Marital Status and Age: DHS Survey
Age groups
22-26
27-31
32-36
37-41
41-49
Total Average
Total sample

Never-married
women

Childless evermarried women

Ever-married with
children

10.40
8.94
7.13
5.92
4.10
8.46
9,932

8.74
7.99
6.51
5.51
4.73
7.48
5,098

6.45
6.67
5.82
5.18
4.11
5.59
72,100

This table is computed using the DHS survey (six rounds). I used both the ever-married questionnaire and the
household member questionnaire. I restrict women age to 22-49, analogous to the analysis in the chapter.
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Table 29: Average Years of Education of Women by Marital Status and Age: Census 2006
Never-married
Ever-married
Education Level
Women
Women
Total sample: age 22-49
% No Education
% Secondary & below
% College & above
Total Population

22.91
44.74
32.35
171,880

51.42
37.8
10.79
1,204,915

Age: 22-26
% No Education
% Secondary & below
% College & above
Total Population

17.18
47.91
34.9
118,726

39.08
49.74
11.18
255,343

Age: 27-31
% No Education
% Secondary & below
% College & above
Total Population

27.13
41.44
31.43
31,519

42.42
44.61
12.97
253,747

Age: 32-36
% No Education
% Secondary & below
% College & above
Total Population

40.44
36.78
22.78
10,959

50.55
38.92
10.54
223,537

Age: 37-41
% No Education
% Secondary & below
% College & above
Total Population

52.78
31.2
16.01
5,932

60.14
30.78
9.08
213,237

Age: 41-49
% No Education
% Secondary & below
% College & above
Total Population

59.21
23.54
17.25
5,178

65.18
24.8
10.02
277,841

This table is computed using the Egypt Population, Housing, and Establishment Census 2006.I restrict women age to
22-49, analogous to the analysis in this chapter.
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Figure 16: 95% CI for the Estimated Discontinuity in Education and Fertility (Restricted
Sample)

Figure 17: 95% CI for the Estimated Effect of Education on Fertility (Restricted Sample)
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Figure 18: Age Distribution of Never-Married Women Age 22-49 (DHS Survey)
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Graphs for Chapter II

Table 30: The Effects of Parent Education on Child Malnutrition: RD Models
Variables
Local Linear
Exogenous variation in mother education

-0.796***
(0.183)
-1.601***
(0.202)

Exogenous variation in father education
(a) Probability of Stunting
Effect of mother education

-0.003
(0.024)
-0.001
(0.023)

Effect of husband education
(b) Probability of Underweight
Effect of mother education

-0.002
(0.013)
0.007
(0.013)

Effect of husband education
(c) Probability of Overweight
Effect of mother education

0.009
(0.019)
-0.011
(0.018)

Effect of husband education

Observations (local sample)

21,947

In all regressions, I use a 60-month bandwidth and a triangle weighting function. I also control for child’s age, child
gender, a binary variable for urban, set of binary variables for region of residence (upper rural, upper urban, lower
rural, lower urban, urban governorates, and frontier governorates), and survey-fixed effects. *** refers to the 99
confidence level. ** refers to the 95 confidence level, and * refers to the 90 confidence level.
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Table 31: The Effects of Parent Education on Child Mortality: RD Models
Local
Variables
Linear
(a) Under-five-year mortality
Exogenous variation in mother’s education
Exogenous variation in father’s education
Estimated effect of mother’s education
Estimated effect of father’s education
Local sample
Total Sample
(b) Under-one-year mortality
Exogenous variation in mother education

-0.813***
(0.175)
-1.493***
(0.197)
0.004
(0.012)
-0.011
(0.012)
26,916
76,311

-0.830***
(0.175)
-1.506***
(0.198)
0.004
(0.011)
-0.009
(0.011)
26,611
72,129

Exogenous variation in father education
Estimated effect of mother education
Estimated effect of father education
Local Sample
Total Sample
(c) Under-one-month mortality
Exogenous variation in mother education

-0.865***
(0.178)
-1.522***
(0.197)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.014
(0.010)
25,593
62,231

Exogenous variation in father education
Estimated effect of mother education
Estimated effect of father education
Local sample
Total Sample

In all these regressions, I control for child’s year of birth, child gender, a binary variable for urban, set of binary
variables for region of residence (upper rural, upper urban, lower rural, lower urban, urban governorates, and
frontier governorates), and survey-fixed effects. *** refers to the 99 confidence level. ** refers to the 95
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Appendix C: Additional Tables and Graphs for Chapter III

Table 32: Percentage of Child Laborers Facing Each Type of Hazardous Condition at Work
% Working
Types of hazardous work
children
Exposed to - dust, fumes at work
44.68
Exposed to – exhaustion
34.56
Exposed to - bending for long time
29.61
Exposed to - extreme cold or heat at work
16.18
Exposed to - no bathroom available
13.93
Exposed to - chemicals (pesticides, glues, etc.)
12.88
Exposed to - loud noise or vibration at work
7.36
Exposed to - insufficient ventilation
5.8
Exposed to - dangerous tools (knives, etc.) at work
5.51
Exposed to - fire, gas, flames at work
3.68
Exposed to - work in water/lake/pond/river
2.99
Exposed to - other things
5.94
Observations
6,550
Table 33: The Distribution of Child Laborers by the Places to Carry Out their Work
Place to carry out child’s work
Market Family
during past week

Work

work

Plantations/farm/garden

25.68

69.64

Factory/Atelier

24.28

1.98

Shop/kiosk/coffee house/restaurant/hotel

13.76

7.6

Construction sites

12

0.37

At (his/her) family dwelling

1.2

14.13

Different places (mobile)

7.38

1.53

Client's place

6.46

0.62

Formal office

3.83

0.82

Others

5.43

3.32

Observations

2,508

4,042
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Table 34: Joint Distribution of Five Work Dimensions (columns percentages)
Age at job
Intensity %
Hazard level %
%
heavy light
hazard nonhazard
kid
teen
100
41.8
87.3 72
Heavy
Intensity
0
58.2
12.7 28
light
100
100
100 100
Total

Type of
employer %
market family
79.7
81.8
20.3
18.2
100
100

Pattern %
summer
78.1
21.9
100

annual
81.8
18.2
100

Hazard
level

hazard
nonhazard
Total

83.2
16.9
100

0
100
100

-

-

67.7
32.3
100

67
33
100

72.5
27.5
100

64.2
35.8
100

61.2
38.9
100

69.9
30.1
100

Age at
job

kid
teen
Total

63.4
36.6
100

39.3
60.7
100

59.1
40.9
100

58.3
41.7
100

-

-

38.6
61.4
100

71.4
28.6
100

61.4
38.7
100

53.2
46.8
100

Type of
employer

market
family
Total

37.7
62.3
100

40.9
59.1
100

41.2
58.8
100

32.2
67.8
100

25.1
74.9
100

57.1
42.9
100

-

-

33.5
66.5
100

45.2
54.8
100

summer
annual
Total

12.9
87.1
100

15.7
84.3
100

12
88.1
100

16.7
83.3
100

15.2
84.8
100

11.3
88.7
100

10.3
89.7
100

15.8
84.2
100

-

-

Pattern
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Table 35: Distribution of Households’ Reasons to Decrease in Income
Reasons to Decrease in Income over the past 12 months
Fall in income - loss of employment of any member
Fall in income - bankruptcy of a family business
Fall in income - illness or serious accident of a working member
Fall in income - death of a working member
Fall in income - abandonment by the household head
Fall in income - fire in house/business/property
Fall in income - criminal act by household member
Fall in income - land dispute
Fall in income - loss of cash support or in-kind assistance
Fall in income - fall in prices of products of the household business
Fall in income - loss of harvest
Fall in income - loss of livestock
Fall in income - other
Total Children

% of
Children
3.25
1.73
7.10
0.63
0.22
0.22
0.05
0.13
0.24
1.04
0.56
1.69
1.11
54,994

Table 36: Description of the Variables Included in the Wealth Index
Six indicator variables for the type of dwelling:
1. Apartment/flat
2. More than one apartment
3. Villa or house
4. Countryside house
5. Room or more in a house unit
6. Separate room or more
Six indicator variables for the ownership of dwelling:
1. Ordinary low rent
2. New rent
3. Furniture rent
4. Property
5. Donation
6. Gift
Five indicator variables for the size of dwelling:
1. less than 20 square meters
2. 20 to 39 square meters
3. 40 to 69 square meters
4. 70 to 99 square meters
5. 100 square meters or more
A continuous variable for the number of rooms per household member
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Five indicators variables for the availability of kitchen:
1. Inside house and exclusive
2. Inside house and shared
3. Outside house and exclusive
4. Outside house and shared
5. Not available
Five indicators variables for the availability of bathroom:
1. Inside house and exclusive
2. Inside house and shared
3. Outside house and exclusive
4. Outside house and shared
5. Not available
Five indicators variables for the type of toilet:
1. Inside house and exclusive
2. Inside house and shared
3. Outside house and exclusive
4. Outside house and shared
5. Not available
Four indicator variables for the source of energy – cooking:
1. Nothing
2. Gas
3. Natural Gas
4. Electricity
Four indicator variables for the source of energy- heating:
1. Nothing
2. Gas
3. Electricity
4. other
Three indicator variables for the source of energy cooling:
1. Nothing
2. Gas
3. Electricity
Three indicator variables for the source of energy lightening:
1. Nothing
2. Gas
3. Electricity
Four indicator variables for the main source for drinking water:
1. Pipe-borne inside house
2. Pipe-borne outside house
3. Borne-hole tubewell
4. Other
Sixteen indicator variables for whether a household owns:
1. Air-condition
2. Fireplace
3. Heater
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4. Automobile
5. Tractor
6. Motor bike
7. Tok Tok
8. Bicycle
9. VCD/DVD player
10. Standard washing machine
11. Oven
12. Dishwasher
13. Sewing machine
14. Satellite/cable TV
15. Mobile phone
16. Radio

Table 37: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for all Child Workers
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1
Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

Pr(Work=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.018***
(0.003)
0.115***
(0.004)
0.021***
(0.001)
-0.031***
(0.005)
0.008***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.000)
0.040***
(0.005)
0.094***
(0.005)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.060***
(0.006)

0.009***
(0.003)
0.006*
(0.003)
-0.018***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.004)
-0.009***
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.000)
-0.008**
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.004)

54,994

54,994

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 38: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Light Activity
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1
Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

Pr(Light Work=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.003*
(0.002)
0.027***
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.004
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.009***
(0.002)
0.023***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
0.019***
(0.003)

0.005**
(0.002)
0.023***
(0.003)
-0.011***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.000)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.003
(0.004)

49,687

49,687

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 39: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Child Labor
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1

Pr(Child Labor=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.018***
(0.003)
0.103***
(0.004)
0.015***
(0.001)
-0.031***
(0.005)
0.007***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.000)
0.036***

0.008***
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
-0.016***
(0.001)
0.012***
(0.004)
-0.009***
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.000)
-0.008**
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Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

(0.005)
0.082***
(0.005)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.050***
(0.005)

(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.004)

53,751

53,751

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 40: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Nonhazardous Work
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1
Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

Pr(Nonhazardous Work=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.006***
(0.002)
0.043***
(0.003)
0.008***
(0.000)
-0.006*
(0.004)
0.003***
(0.001)
-0.002***
(0.000)
0.018***
(0.003)
0.044***
(0.003)
0.001**
(0.000)
0.027***
(0.004)

0.006***
(0.002)
0.021***
(0.003)
-0.011***
(0.001)
0.009**
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.000)
-0.005
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.004
(0.004)

50,581

50,581

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 41: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Hazardous Work
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1
Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

Pr(Hazardous Work=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.016***
(0.003)
0.093***
(0.003)
0.016***
(0.001)
-0.030***
(0.004)
0.006***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.000)
0.030***
(0.005)
0.067***
(0.005)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.044***
(0.005)

0.008***
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
-0.016***
(0.001)
0.013***
(0.004)
-0.009***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.000)
-0.008**
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.004)

52,857

52,857

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 42: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Working as a Kid
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1

Pr(started to work as a kid=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.014***
(0.003)
0.075***
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.000)
-0.023***
(0.005)
0.006***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.000)
0.042***
140

0.007***
(0.002)
0.017***
(0.003)
-0.012***
(0.001)
0.012***
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.000)
-0.008**

Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

(0.005)
0.076***
(0.004)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.050***
(0.005)

(0.004)
-0.004
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.004)

52,297

52,297

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 43: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Working as a Teen
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1
Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

Pr(started to work as a teen=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.014***
(0.003)
0.077***
(0.004)
0.007***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.005)
0.006***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.000)
0.047***
(0.005)
0.074***
(0.004)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.053***
(0.005)

0.006**
(0.002)
0.017***
(0.003)
-0.012***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.000)
-0.008**
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
0.003
(0.004)

47,538

47,538

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

141

Table 44: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Summer Work
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1
Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

Pr(Summer Work=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.017***
(0.002)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.007***
(0.002)

0.004**
(0.002)
0.027***
(0.003)
-0.009***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.003)
-0.007***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.005
(0.003)

48,933

48,933

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 45: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Annual Work
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1

Pr(Annual Work=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.008***
(0.002)
0.073***
(0.003)
0.015***
(0.001)
-0.017***
(0.004)
0.004***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.000)
0.023***

0.007***
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.016***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.004)
-0.009***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.000)
-0.009**
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Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

(0.004)
0.040***
(0.004)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.030***
(0.004)

(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.004)

51,597

51,597

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 46: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Family Work
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1
Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

Pr(Family Work=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.008**
(0.003)
0.072***
(0.004)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.030***
(0.005)
0.005***
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.000)
0.036***
(0.005)
0.087***
(0.005)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.066***
(0.005)

0.005**
(0.002)
0.025***
(0.003)
-0.012***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.000)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.004)

52,486

52,486

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 47: Bivariate Probit Model: AME of Household Income for Market Work
VARIABLES
Ln(income)
Child is male = 1
Child age
Urban = 1
HH size
Education of head
Head was a child laborer = 1
Mother work = 1
Size of agriculture land
Own livestock = 1

Observations

Pr(Market Work=1) Pr(School=1)
-0.012***
(0.002)
0.064***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.001)
-0.007**
(0.003)
0.004***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.003)
0.016***
(0.003)
-0.001**
(0.000)
0.003
(0.003)

0.009***
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.016***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.004)
-0.009***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.000)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.001*
(0.001)
0.004
(0.004)

50,952

50,952

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 48: Bivariate Probit Model (with IV): AME of Household Income by Gender
Male
Female
Sample
Work
School
Work
All Working children
-0.133
0.038
-0.075**
S.E.
(0.082)
(0.05)
(0.038)
P-value
[0.102]
[0.491]
[0.048]
Observations
28,273
28,273
26,721
1) Work intensity
Light economic activity
-0.008
0.001
-0.023
S.E.
(0.039)
(0.036)
(0.022)
P-value
[0.835]
[0.970]
[0.313]
Observations
24,141
24,141
25,546
Child laborers (ILO definition)
-0.133*
0.045
-0.057*
S.E.
(0.073)
(0.053)
(0.031)
P-value
[0.070]
[0.395]
[0.064]
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School
-0.013
(0.041)
[0.754]
26,721
-0.007
(0.038)
[0.857]
25,546
-0.021
(0.040)
[0.610]

Observations
2) Hazard exposure
Nonhazardous work
S.E.
P-value
Observations
Hazardous work
S.E.
P-value
Observations
3) Work pattern
Summer work
S.E.
P-value
Observations
Work all the year
S.E.
P-value
Observations
4) Type of employer
Unpaid Family work
S.E.
P-value
Observations
Market work
S.E.
P-value
Observations

27,398

27,398

26,353

26,353

0.030
(0.052)
[0.555]
24,760
-0.159**
(0.069)
[0.020]
26,779

-0.001
(0.039)
[0.799]
24,760
0.055
(0.051)
[0.280]
26,779

-0.031
(0.029)
[0.285]
25,821
-0.053*
(0.027)
[0.054]
26,078

-0.008
(0.038)
[0.829]
25,821
-0.019
(0.040)
[0.631]
26,078

0.005
(0.031)
[0.877]
23,686
0.008
(0.062)
[0.898]
25,826

0.009
(0.032)
[0.781]
23,686
0.028
(0.051)
[0.577]
25,826

n.a.*
n.a.
n.a.
25,247
0.022
(0.025)
[0.382]
25,771

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
25,247
-0.021
(0.040)
[0.594]
25,771

-0.095
(0.065)
[0.145]
26,101
-0.032
(0.051)
[0.527]
25,438

0.078*
(0.0438)
[0.070]
26,101
-0.031
(0.048)
[0.522]
25,438

-0.049
(0.032)
[0.129]
26,385
-0.028
(0.017)
[0.103]
25,514

-0.018
(0.040)
[0.644]
26,385
-0.006
(0.039)
[0.881]
25,514

*Only 69 girls work during summer only, and hence the regression is not feasible. This model is estimated using the
two-stage residual inclusion approach introduced by Terza et al. (2008) (see the text). I control for child age, an
urban dummy, family size, education of the head of the household, a dummy for whether the head of the household
was a child laborer, the age of the head of the household, a dummy if a child’s mother works, a dummy for singleparent household, a dummy for whether a household owns livestock, size of agricultural land, the age of the head of
the household, the highest four quintiles of the wealth index, and the first-stage residuals from Eq.9. Standard errors
are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99 percent confidence level, ** refers to the 95 percent confidence level,
and * refers to the 90 percent confidence level.
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Table 49: Bivariate Probit Model (with IV): AME of Household Income by Region
Urban
Rural
Sample
Work
School
Work
School
All Working children
-0.074**
0.070**
-0.118
-0.070
S.E.
(0.033)
(0.032)
(0.081)
(0.069)
P-value
[0.026]
[0.026]
[0.146]
[0.311]
Observations
27,784
27,784
27,210
27,210
1) Work intensity
Light economic activity
S.E.
P-value
Observations
Child laborers (ILO definition)
S.E.
P-value
Observations
2) Hazard exposure
Nonhazardous work
S.E.
P-value
Observations
Hazardous work
S.E.
P-value
Observations
3) Work pattern
Summer work
S.E.
P-value
Observations
Work all the year
S.E.
P-value
Observations

-0.018
(0.017)
[0.286]
26,389

0.068**
(0.027)
[0.012]
26,389

-0.004
(0.049)
[0.928]
23,298

-0.105*
(0.059)
[0.075]
23,298

-0.062**
(0.028)
[0.028]
27,331

0.071**
(0.031)
[0.022]
27,331

-0.119
(0.078)
[0.125]
26,420

-0.070
(0.067)
[0.299]
26,420

-0.020
(0.024)
[0.425]
26,389

0.061**
(0.029)
[0.031]
26,389

0.020
(0.060)
[0.737]
23,928

-0.110*
(0.059)
[0.061]
23,928

-0.056**
(0.023)
[0.017]
26,779

0.079**
(0.030)
[0.010]
26,779

-0.145*
(0.075)
[0.053]
25,790

-0.065
(0.067)
[0.329]
25,790

-0.014
(0.014)
[0.324]
26,103

0.065**
(0.027)
[0.014]
26,103

0.048
(0.033)
[0.143]
22,830

-0.102*
(0.055)
[0.063]
22,830

0.011
(0.023)
[0.614]
26,911

0.064**
0.032)
[0.046]
26,911

0.043
(.069)
[0.529]
24,686

-0.087
(0.067)
[0.190]
24,686
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4) Type of employer
Unpaid Family work
S.E.
P-value
Observations

-0.041*
(0.022)
[0.064]
26,680

0.072**
(0.028)
[0.010]
26,680

-0.092
(0.076)
[0.222]
25,806

-0.027
(0.063)
[0.665]
25,806

Market work
S.E.
P-value
Observations

-0.036
(0.024)
[0.134]
27,040

0.066**
(0.032)
[0.038]
27,040

-0.046
(0.056)
[0.408]
23,912

-0.137**
(0.066)
[0.038]
23,912

This model is estimated using the two-stage residual inclusion approach introduced by Terza et al. (2008) (see the
text). I control for child gender, child age, family size, education of the head of the household, a dummy for whether
the head of the household was a child laborer, the age of the head of the household, a dummy if a child’s mother
works, a dummy for single-parent household, a dummy for whether a household owns livestock, size of agricultural
land, the age of the head of the household, the highest four quintiles of the wealth index, and the first-stage residuals
from Eq.9. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** refers to the 99 percent confidence level, ** refers to the
95 percent confidence level, and * refers to the 90 percent confidence level.
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